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DONALD WILLIAM YORK, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 980099-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the trial court's denial of defendai.l .1. li 1.1 
withdraw sot yuilty pleo ^ degree murder, a first degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1979); and one count of attempted 
manslaughter, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 
(1975). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Anr 8-2a-3(2)(j) 
(1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court properly refuse to address issues that 
defendant previously litigated in state post-convicuu: ^eedings? 
1 
2. Did the trial court correctly conclude that defendant's trial counsel 
was constitutionally effective? 
3. Does the record as a whole demonstrate that defendant pled 
guilty with full knowledge and understanding of the consequences and of the rights 
he was waiving? 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
This Court reviews a trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Stilling. 856 P.2d 666, 670 
(Utah App. 1993). Accord State v. Blair. 868 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1993) (citations 
omitted). An abuse of discretion is a determination that the trial court acted beyond 
the bounds of reasonability. State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993). 
Furthermore, the trial court's "findings of fact which lead to its ultimate decision will 
not be 'set aside unless they are clearly erroneous.'" Stilling. 856 P.2d at 870 
(quoting State v. Gardner. 844 P.2d 293, 295 (Utah 1992)). 
Since defendant entered his plea prior to the Utah Supreme Court's 
decision in State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), the strict compliance 
standard of Gibbons does not apply. See Stilling. 856 P.2d at 671; Blair. 868 P.2d 
at 805. Instead, this Court will uphold a decision denying a motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea if "the record as a whole affirmatively establishes that the defendant 
entered his plea with full knowledge and understanding of its consequences and of 
2 
the rights he was waiving." Blair. 868 P.2d at 806 (citations omitted). Accord State 
v. Gardner. 844 992). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
The text of any relevant constitutional provisions, statutes or rules is 
contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In June 1984, defendant was charged in the Second Judicial District 
Court, Davis County, with first degree murder, a capital offense, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1984); attempted second degict 
lili HI/ hi I III ill f nde Ann. §§ 76-5-203 M979\ 76-4-102 (1983); and 
aggravated burglary, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 
(1973) (York v. Shulsen. 875 P.2d 590 (Utah App. 1994); Addendum A). Pursuant 
to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to the amended charges ul sei I 
degree murder, n In I Jwjii.v li I N , m violation I Ul, id 'ode Ann. § 76-5-203 
(1979); and attempted manslaughter, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1975) (R. 50-51, 55-57). The State agreed to recommend 
concurrent sentences and to forego seeking a firearm enhanceme 
sentenced defendant ears-to-life for second degree murder and to 
3 
a consecutive term of zero-to-five years for attempted manslaughter (York, 875 P.2d 
at 593; Addendum A). 
Defendant unsuccessfully sought state post-conviction and federal 
habeas relief (R. 103-07). In August 1996, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his 
guilty pleas (R. 64-87). After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied 
defendant's request (R.325-335; Addendum B). Defendant timely appealed (R. 
338). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
The Shootings 
On June 17, 1984, defendant purchased with cash an airline ticket to 
fly from California to Salt Lake City under the false name of Dan Hill (York. 875 P.2d 
at 592; Addendum A) (R. 326; Addendum B). After his arrival in Salt Lake City later 
that day, defendant rented a car using his true name, Donald York (id.). Thereafter, 
defendant drove to the home of his ex-wife, Patricia York. Armed with a loaded gun, 
defendant entered his ex-wife's home, went to Ms. York's bedroom, and fired twelve 
defendant recites the facts in the light most favorable to him, which is 
contrary to the trial court's findings. See Brief of App. at 5-9. Appellee 
appropriately recites the facts in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings. 
See Ohline Corp. v. Granite Mill. 849 P.2d 602, 603 (Utah App. 1993) (citing 
State v. Moosman. 794 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah 1990)). 
4 
to fourteen shots, seriously wounding Ms. York and killing her boyfriend, Jeff 
Long hurst (|<±). 
Defendant's Surrender 
I if«ndar rrendered himself to 
Bountiful police (York. 875 P.2d at 892; Addendum A). Defendant told the police 
dispatcher, "I'm the man you want... I'm the one that did the shooting" (Preliminary 
Hearing Transcript [hereinafter P.H. Tr.] at 73-74). Defendant told the officers that 
there , • id asked whether Ms YoiK ,iiid MI 
Longhurst were alive (York. 875 P.2d at 892; Addendum A). Defendant also told the 
police where to find the gun and shells, and stated he was going to hell and could 
no longer be a member of his church because of what he had done (id.). 
Competency/Sanity Examinations Ordered 
Shortly after the State charged defendant with the shootings, defendant 
filed a notice of insanity defense pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-3 (1983) (R. 
25-26). The trial court then appointed two mental health experts to examine 
defendant's mental condition as require 
Roth experts opined that defendant was not mentally ill. Specifically, Dr. 
Ghicadus, a psychiatrist employed by the Davis County Mental Health Center, 
concluded that defendant was "not 'insane' in a legal sense of the word, is not 
psychotic in a psychiatric sense, but [had] variances and neurotic traits that [dia 
5 
seriously interfere with one's everyday life" (R. 126-126a).2 Dr. Ghicadus further 
concluded that defendant "[was] mentally competent to understand trial proceedings 
and would be able to assist in his defense" (R. 126). Dr. Ghicadus noted that the 
source of defendant's alleged amnesia3 could not be determined without conducting 
a "complete neurologic examination" (id).4 He further stated that defendant's claim 
of amnesia, for which there was no documented history, made it virtually impossible 
to retrospectively assess defendant's state of mind at the time of the crime (R. 126). 
Dr. Kimball, a psychologist employed by the Davis County Mental 
Health Center, similarly found "no signs of any psychoses, illogical thinking, 
delusions or hallucinations" (R. 131a). He further noted that defendant's "train of 
thought appears to be normal," and that defendant's mental status exam was normal 
except for anxiety and a reduced ability to concentrate (id). Dr. Kimball opined that 
defendant was able to recognize right from wrong and that there was no medical 
evidence of a dissociative state that would reduce defendant's capacity to control his 
impulses (R. 132). Dr. Kimball also stated that validity indicators on written tests 
2The doctors' reports are two-sided, however, the trial court did not record 
paginate the second side of the page. Therefore, appellee has simply designated 
the blank pages with an "a" (e.g. R. 126a, 127a,. . . etc.). 
defendant told the doctors that he lacked any memory of the shootings. 
defendant incorrectly asserts that Dr. Ghicadus and Dr. Kimball 
"requested" additional testing. Compare Brief of App. at 4 with R. 126, 129. 
6 
indicated that defendant was "faking bad and faking sick" (I Kimball 
character:ITI rlrti'iirhiil'1, i LHIIUMI .IIIIIII 'SM ,r, "lipjiiviy," noting that defendant's 
"memory before the incident was good and his memory after the incident is good" 
(kl). However, because there was some evidence that defendant had "a couple of 
accidents where there was some brain injury supposedly [sic]," the doctor also noted 
"further examination [wasj m UIL ; 




degre inn degree feinm violation ~* Jtah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 
(1979); and attempted manslaughter, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-205 (1975) (R. 55-6, 139-145a). During the plea colloquy, the court 
clerk handed a copy of the amended information to defendant and read u 
Although defendant claimed that he had no memory 
of the shootings, he agreed with his trial counsel's assessment that if the matter had 
gone to trial, the facts probably would have lead to a first or second degree murder 
conviction, and for that reason, defendant desired to plead gui 
Defendant admitted that he was "very much so" satisfied with counsel's advice and 
representation (R. 141a, 142a). Defendant agreed that he was pleading guilty 
7 
because he believed that he "in fact engaged in the conduct," and because he 
wanted to "get this over with" (R. 143-44). The trial court explained that by pleading 
guilty, defendant was waiving his right to a jury trial, his right to call witnesses and 
to require the State to call witnesses, and his right to force the State to prove each 
element beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury of defendant's peers (R. 142). The trial 
court advised defendant of the possible maximum sentences for each charge, and 
informed defendant that the court was not bound by any sentencing 
recommendations (R. 141a, 142a). At the conclusion of the plea colloquy, the trial 
court found that defendant knowingly pled guilty to both counts of the amended 
information (R. 144). 
Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) Diagnosis5 
After defendant was incarcerated at the Utah State Prison, Dr. Carlisle, 
the prison psychiatrist, conducted several hypnosis/therapy sessions with defendant 
in 1985 and ultimately diagnosed defendant as having MPD (R. 182-92) (York. 875 
P.2d at 593; Addendum A). Based upon the MPD diagnosis, defendant sought post-
conviction relief (R. 147-157). 
5The MPD diagnosis is not pertinent to the issues presented in this appeal. 
However, it is relevant to the district court's refusal to re-examine the issue of 
defendant's competency, and will provide this Court with an understanding of 
prior proceedings. Although MPD is currently referred to as Dissociative Identity 
Disorder ("DID"), at the time Dr. Carlisle diagnosed defendant, the disorder was still 
known as MPD. Therefore, appellee uses the term MPD throughout its brief. 
8 
At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Dr. Carlisle testified that even 
though defendant likely had MPD at the time of the shootings, defendant would have 
been capable of rational thought and could have formed the intent to kill, as well as 
understood the nature of his crimes (R. 182-92) (York. 875 P.2d at 593; Addendum 
A). Dr. Carlisle also stressed that defendant would have been capable of 
understanding court proceedings and assisting his attorney (id). For these reasons, 
Dr. Carlisle concluded defendant was competent when he pled guilty to the 
shootings (\±). Defendant's witness, Dr. Alan E. Jeppsen, agreed with Dr. Carlisle's 
MPD diagnosis, but disagreed that defendant was competent to enter the guilty 
pleas (R. 194)(York, 875 P.2d at 593; Addendum A). 
State Post-Conviction Court's Ruling 
On July 16, 1991, upon consideration of the evidence, including the 
initial police reports, the written evaluations of Doctors Ghicadus and Kimball, the 
testimony of Doctors Carlisle and Jeppsen, and the transcripts of defendant's plea 
colloquy, the state post-conviction court denied defendant's request for post-
conviction relief (R. 203-04). The post-conviction court concluded that defendant 
was competent when he pled guilty on October 29, 1984 (id). The court further 
concluded that the trial court properly accepted defendant's guilty pleas to the crimes 
defendant claimed to have no memory of, but was willing to plead to in exchange for 
a favorable plea bargain (jd). 
9 
State Post-Conviction Appeal 
On appeal from the denial of state post-conviction relief, this Court held 
that the trial did not err by failing to hold a competency hearing prior to accepting 
defendant's pleas (York. 875 P.2d at 597; Addendum A). This Court declined to 
reach the merits of defendant's claim of error in finding him competent, but in a 
footnote stated the likelihood that the evidence was sufficient to support the state 
post-conviction court's determination of competency (jdL at 598). 
Second State Post-Conviction Petition 
On October 23, 1995, defendant filed another petition for post-
conviction relief in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, claiming: (1) 
his trial counsel was ineffective; (2) the criminal trial court denied him due process; 
(3) prosecutorial misconduct; and (4) the state post-conviction court denied him due 
process (R. 217-24). The case was transferred to the Second Judicial District Court, 
Davis County, which appointed Jerold Mcphee on a pro bono basis to represent 
defendant (R. 226). Through counsel, defendant amended his post-conviction 
petition, claiming that: (1) defendant received ineffective assistance of trial counsel; 
(2) defendant's trial counsel had a conflict of interest; (3) defendant's plea was 
unknowing and involuntary; and (4) defendant was incompetent to enter his guilty 
pleas (R. 228-38). On August 29, 1996, defendant, through counsel, voluntarily 
dismissed the amended petition (R. 240). 
10 
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas 
After unsuccessfully pursuing state post-conviction and federal habeas 
relief, defendant moved to vacate his guilty pleas on the following grounds: (1) 
defendant received ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (2) defendant's trial 
counsel had a conflict of interest; (3) defendant's plea was unknowing and 
involuntary; (4) defendant was incompetent when he pled guilty; and (5) the trial 
court should have held a competency hearing prior to accepting defendant's guilty 
pleas (R. 64-87). 
On January 27, 1998, the trial court issued a ruling concluding that 
defendant had failed to demonstrate unusual circumstances warranting relitigation 
of the following claims which had been previously adjudicated by the post-conviction 
court: (1) the trial court's failure to hold a competency hearing; and (2) defendant's 
competence to plead guilty (R. 261-62). Additionally, the trial court reviewed the 
record as a whole and determined that defendant's guilty pleas substantially 
complied with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (R. 262). The trial court 
scheduled §m evidentiary hearing for defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel and the voluntariness of his guilty pleas (R. 262). 
The Evidentiary Hearing 
On August 13, 1997, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on 
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. The following witnesses testified: 
11 
Dr. Chris Ghicadus, Dr. Heber Kimball, George Diumenti (defendant's original 
defense counsel), defendant, Susan Wilson, and Mildreth Gilgen.6 
Dr. Ghicadus 
Dr. Ghicadus, who found defendant competent to stand trial, testified 
only that he did not recall Mr. Diumenti contacting him after he had issued his mental 
health report (R. 368). 
Dr. Kimball 
Dr. Kimball, who also found defendant competent to stand trial, testified 
only that he did not recall Mr. Diumenti contacting him regarding his mental health 
report (R. 371). 
George Diumenti 
Mr. Diumenti [hereinafter Diumenti] had been a criminal attorney for 
approximately thirteen years at the time defendant retained him and his partner, Bill 
Lindsley [hereinafter Lindsley] (R. 372-73). At that time, Diumenti had handled 
approximately twelve murder cases, about four of which had gone to trial (R. 427). 
Diumenti had handled three capital cases prior to defendant's, and immediately prior 
to taking defendant's case, he achieved a successful "straight murder" conviction in 
State v. Rocko. which was charged as capital murder (R. 428). 
6The transcript of the evidentiary hearing incorrectly refers to "Meredith 
Gilgen," however, the witness's name first name is Milclreth. See R. 174, 323. 
12 
As a retainer for representing defendant, Diumenti received $6,000 on 
June 21, 1984 (R. 373). The retainer funds came from traveler's checks that 
defendant was carrying when he was arrested (id.). Diumenti does not get involved 
in collections and, in fact, intentionally avoids knowing how much his clients owe him 
so that it will not affect his judgment (R. 449). At the time Diumenti discussed the 
plea agreement with defendant, he had no idea how much money defendant owed 
him (R. 449-50). 
Diumenti received all the evidence that the prosecution and police 
agencies possessed; certainly "every single fact relevant and germane to 
[defendant's] defense that was available" (R. 378,434,480). Over the course of his 
15-20 meetings with defendant, Diumenti discussed all the evidence with defendant, 
especially the incriminating evidence "ad nauseam" (R. 375,380). Defendant never 
had to request to see evidence because Diumenti and Lindsley regularly contacted 
defendant and submitted all their information to him (R. 390). Diumenti recalls 
discussing with defendant the possibility that shots were fired at Pat York's house 
after defendant left (R. 379-80). Ultimately, Diumenti determined that the 
defendant's claim that shots were fired after he left would have appeared ridiculous 
to a trier of fact (R. 380). 
Diumenti researched and discussed with defendant the possible 
available mental defenses (R. 385). Diumenti initially thought that manslaughter was 
13 
a possibility due to defendant's "enraged" mental state (R. 385-86). The initial 
manslaughter theory was based on the fact that Pat York and Jeff Longhurst had 
both been taunting defendant and Pat was threatening to take defendant's business 
(R. 386). Defendant's manslaughter defense started falling apart three or four days 
after Diumenti received all the police reports (R. 450). In Diumenti's opinion, it was 
an "open and shut case;" the only issue was whether Diumenti could convince a jury 
that it was manslaughter based upon defendant's state of mind (R. 430). However, 
the evidence supporting manslaughter never materialized (R. 430). 
Defendant came up with many fanciful alternatives for the crime (e.g. 
his twenty-one year-old daughter, Anita, was the shooter; some red-haired guy 
hiding in the bathroom was the shooter) (R. 406). Defendant also theorized that Pat 
York set him up in order to gain control of defendant's company (R. 463-64). 
However, Pat York was already a majority shareholder in defendant's company and, 
therefore, it would have been difficult to show any financial gain or benefit in her 
framing defendant. In fact, pursuing Pat York's "motive" could have hurt defendant's 
case (R. 463-64, 479-80). Diumenti never found any evidence to support 
defendant's alternative theories (R. 457). Diumenti considers himself a good 
salesman with a jury, but none of defendant's "wild scenarios" would have been 
convincing to a jury (R. 406), especially since the evidence against defendant was 
"absolutely totally frustrating, very significant, [and] pretty convincing" (R. 428). In 
14 
Diumenti's mind, there was no way to refute the fact that defendant shot Jeff 
Longhurst and Pat York (R. 444). 
The State had the following evidence implicating defendant in the 
shooting of Jeff Longhurst and Pat York: Pat York and Anita Humphries7 identified 
defendant as the shooter (R. 430-37); Pat York identified defendant's gun as the 
weapon (R. 433); defendant voluntarily appeared at the police station and confessed 
while Anita was on the phone with the police dispatcher on the 911 call about the 
shootings (R. 435-36,442-43); defendant told Officer Stone that he flew to Salt Lake, 
bought a pistol and extra bullets, and left the gun at Pat York's house (R. 438); 
defendant spontaneously announced to Officer Richey that he turned himself in 
because he "didn't like chases" (R. 440); defendant made a similar statement to 
Officer Vaughn (R. 442); and defendant told Anita that if he found Jeff Longhurst 
within 50 miles of Pat York, he would hunt him down and kill him like a dog (R. 451-
52). Diumenti could not find a way to keep out the foregoing incriminating 
statements (R. 436,439,443,451). Defendant's statement that he would hunt down 
Jeff Longhurst and shoot him like a dog evidences pre-meditation and was the "one 
hurdle that [Diumenti and Lindsley] never did really figure out how to get over" (R. 
454). Diumenti was convinced that the admissible evidence against defendant 
defendant's and Pat York's daughter. 
15 
"would have easily, if not overwhelmingly, supported a conviction of at least first 
degree murder and very possibly capital homicide" (R. 479). 
Lindsley was primarily responsible for determining what if any mental 
defenses applied to defendant (R. 386). Diumenti and Lindsley discussed the 
mental health issues many times and tried to reconcile the opinions of Drs. Ghicadus 
and Kimball with the state of the law (R. 386-87). Lindsley told Diumenti that he had 
reviewed this information with defendant (kL). Diumenti discussed with Lindsley the 
possibility of discrepancies in the two reports that would justify getting a third expert 
(R. 404). However, they ultimately concluded that it would not have been in 
defendant's best interest to hire a third expert (R. 410, 457). Diumenti did not tell 
defendant that he would obtain additional experts; he simply advised defendant that 
if more experts were necessary, defendant would have to retain them (R. 408-09). 
Eventually, Diumenti told defendant that it was not in defendant's best interest to 
undergo further testing and that no additional expert would be used (R. 410-412). 
Although Diumenti originally filed a notice of intent to present an insanity 
or mental health defense, after reviewing the case and the doctors' reports, he did 
not see any facts that would support an insanity defense (R. 387-88, 455-56). 
Diumenti personally advised defendant not to pursue such a defense in light of the 
doctors' reports (R. 387). The preliminary hearing evidence and the doctors' reports 
convinced Diumenti that the State's evidence supported the charges (R. 475-76). 
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After discussing the possible plea agreement, which was in defendant's best 
interest, defendant told Diumenti to withdraw the insanity defense (R. 389). 
Diumenti explained to defendant the ramifications of withdrawing the insanity 
defense (R. 390). 
Diumenti did not check to see if the serial number on the murder 
weapon matched the serial number listed on defendant's gun permit because, given 
the evidence against defendant, it was not an issue (R. 455). 
Defendant never told Diumenti that he had no memory of the shootings, 
however, Diumenti was not surprised that during the plea colloquy defendant 
claimed amnesia (R. 415). Defendant's plea colloquy claim of amnesia was a "poor 
choice" on defendant's part, although not unusual as it is hard to admit taking 
another person's life (R. 472-73,481). Defendant's self-serving statement during the 
plea colloquy was the only evidence of defendant's memory loss (R. 480-81). Given 
defendant's confession at the police station approximately ten minutes after the 
shootings, a jury would not have believed defendant's claim of amnesia had he 
presented it at trial (R. 429). Diumenti did not think that defendant lacked a memory 
of the shootings because: defendant told the police that he was the shooter; 
defendant stated that he had left extra bullets in the rental car; and in Diumenti's 
initial conversations with defendant, defendant recalled specific details of 
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conversations that he had with police up until the time he was taken into custody (R. 
448). 
Defendant agreed that the State's plea offer was "more than 
reasonable" (R. 458). Diumenti discussed with defendant the possible outcome if 
defendant went to trial, the strength of the State's case, the benefit of pleading guilty 
to the reduced offenses, the elements of the amended charges, and the evidence 
supporting the statutory elements (R. 417, 419). Diumenti was confident that 
defendant understood the elements of the offenses (R. 458). He would never advise 
a client to plead guilty if he thought that they truly did not understand the plea 
proceedings and the facts that they were admitting (R. 533). Diumenti never told 
defendant during the plea proceeding (or in preparation for the plea hearing) that in 
order to restore his memory, defendant had to "just go along with the system" (R. 
417-18). Diumenti has never used that phrase and finds it "repulsive," at least in a 
pre-incarceration setting (R. 418). However, Diumenti advises his clients, post-
incarceration, to learn the institutional rules and conduct themselves accordingly to 
help ensure a favorable parole hearing (R. 418). Diumenti never told defendant that, 
as a condition of the plea agreement, defendant would only go to the state hospital 
(R. 418). Defendant alone decided to accept the plea agreement; Diumenti did not 
force him (R. 459). 
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Diumenti does not recall defendant asking him to move to withdraw 
defendant's pleas or pursue an appeal (R. 419-20). Diumenti informed defendant, 
as he does in all homicide cases, that he would not handle an appeal (]g\). Diumenti 
does not believe that an attorney can be effective at both trial and appellate work (R. 
420). 
Diumenti did "everything in [his] power" to ensure that Sue Wilson, wife 
of prosecutor Mel Wilson, would prepare the presentence report (R. 420).8 Diumenti 
has known Ms. Wilson since 1970 as a friend and as the wife of another friend (R. 
421). In his opinion, Ms. Wilson reflects the best characteristics of what is required 
of someone conducting presentence investigations; she is open-minded and listens 
(R. 421). Having Ms. Wilson conduct the presentence investigation was "without 
question" in defendant's best interest, and Diumenti strategically chose her (R. 421, 
459). Diumenti told defendant that Ms. Wilson would be preparing the presentence 
report and disclosed to defendant his relationship with Ms. Wilson and Mel Wilson 
(R. 421-23). The presentence report was available for defendant to review and 
Diumenti never told defendant that he was not allowed to see the report (R. 423-25). 
Diumenti recalls that Lindsley reviewed the presentence report with defendant and 
8By the time the State offered defendant the plea agreement, Mel Wilson 
had left the prosecutor's office (R. 460-01). Mel Wilson was not involved in 
presenting the plea agreement; Diumenti dealt with William "Bill" McGuire (R. 
460-01). 
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that he (Diumenti) addressed the court during the sentencing hearing (R. 424-25). 
The court gave defendant and Diumenti an opportunity to refute claims in the 
presentence report, which accurately reflected defendant's state of mind and the 
circumstances surrounding the crime (R. 426-27). Diumenti consulted Lonnie 
DeLand and another criminal attorney regarding how the Board of Pardons typically 
treated consecutive five-to-life sentences (R. 532). Diumenti informed defendant 
that he was probably going to prison; the only question was for how long (R. 534, 
537). 
Diumenti does not recall having a post-sentencing conversation with 
Mildreth Gilgen (R. 531). Diumenti has never told anyone that: (1) defendant's MPD 
did not surprise him; (2) he knew that defendant did not understand the crimes that 
he pled guilty to; or (3) he had to tell defendant that he would not go to prison in 
order to convince him to plead guilty (R. 532-33). 
Defendant 
Defendant's testimony contradicted Diumenti's on virtually every issue 
(R. 485-509), however, the trial court found Diumenti more credible (R. 325-334, 
550). 
Sue Wilson 
Prior to conducting defendant's presentence investigation, Ms. Wilson 
informed defendant that she was married to Mel Wilson; it was her policy to disclose 
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this information to everyone (R. 511-12). Defendant did not object to Ms. Wilson 
preparing the presentence report and, in fact, told Ms. Wilson that he was 
comfortable with her because he had heard that she was as fair or more fair than 
anyone in her office (R. 512). Her husband, Mel, never attempted to influence her 
presentence recommendation (R. 514). 
Mildreth Gilgen 
Ms. Gilgen met defendant while she was an intern in the psychology 
department at the prison (R. 517-18). Ms. Gilgen assisted Dr. Carlisle in diagnosing 
defendant as suffering from MPD, and was defendant's therapist (R. 521,523). Ms. 
Gilgen previously testified that she considers defendant a friend and that she 
allowed defendant (in the past) to call her at home (R. 525). Ms. Gilgen has been 
assisting defendant (regarding defendant's attempt to vacate his guilty pleas) for the 
past six years (R. 525, 528). Ms. Gilgen testified that in a phone conversation, after 
defendant was in prison, Diumenti told her that he did not think defendant was guilty 
but that he did not know how to represent defendant (R. 522). Diumenti also 
allegedly told Ms. Gilgen that he was not surprised that defendant was diagnosed 
as having multiple personalities (R. 521). The trial court discounted Ms. Gilgen's 
testimony in its entirety, finding that, despite all the incriminating evidence, Ms. 
Gilgen decided right away that defendant was not guilty and "set out to prove" it (R. 
552-553, 333). 
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The Trial Court's Ruling 
The trial court found that the State's evidence implicating defendant as 
the shooter was uncontroverted and inconsistent with defendant's alleged amnesia 
(R. 549-550).9 Furthermore, defendant's testimony regarding which specific portions 
of police reports he had seen previously negated his claimed memory loss (R. 550). 
A jury would almost certainly have concluded that defendant's amnesia was "really 
convenient" and, therefore, presenting an amnesia defense would have completely 
devastated a potential insanity claim (R. 551). 
Concerning defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for 
failure to investigate, the trial court found that the only evidence Diumenti did not 
develop was a comparison of the serial number on the gun and the number on 
defendant's gun license (R. 551,331-32). The court properly determined that "if you 
look at the facts of the case, those arguments are so ludicrous that in the context of 
a capital homicide case, to even forward those kind of defenses with the flimsy 
evidence that was available and in light of the other [incriminating] evidence, would 
completely jeopardize any credibility that the defendant might have" (R. 551). 
9These incriminating facts are recited throughout this brief. Therefore, 
appellee does not again list them here. 
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The trial court also found that no conflict of interest existed between 
defendant and Diumenti, and that Diumenti was not deficient in any way (R. 552-53). 
Accordingly, the court did not address the issue of prejudice (R. 553, 334). 
The court determined that Diumenti strategically chose Sue Wilson to 
prepare the presentence report and that Ms. Wilson's relation to Mel Wilson was fully 
disclosed to defendant (R. 332-33). Defendant neither objected to Ms. Wilson's 
involvement nor identified any errors in the presentence report (R. 333, 554). 
Regarding the voluntariness of the defendant's guilty pleas, the trial 
court concluded that the State's evidence supported the capital homicide charges 
and that Diumenti did not coerce defendant to plead guilty (R. 334). Defendant 
made the ultimate decision to accept the plea offer and never insisted on going to 
trial (R. 332). Furthermore, when he pled guilty, defendant was aware of the 
elements of the charges and "entered that plea knowingly, knowing full well that he 
was going to prison" (R. 552). 
Finally, the trial court refused to relitigate the following claims that 
defendant raised in his state post-conviction proceeding: (1) defendant's 
competence to stand trial; and (2) the trial court's failure to hold a formal competency 
hearing (R. 333). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly declined to address defendant's claims 
regarding his competency to stand trial because defendant previously litigated these 
issues in his post-conviction petition. Defendant failed to demonstrate good cause 
warranting further review. 
Withdrawal of a guilty plea is a privilege, not a right. Accordingly, 
defendant has the burden of demonstrating good cause. State v. Brocksmith. 888 
P.2d 703, 704 (Utah App. 1994). Since defendant knowingly and voluntarily pled 
guilty with the assistance of constitutionally effective counsel, no good cause exists 
to vacate defendant's pleas. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying defendant relief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO 
ADDRESS ISSUES THAT DEFENDANT PREVIOUSLY 
LITIGATED 
Defendant previously litigated his claims that: (1) he was incompetent 
to stand trial/plead guilty; and (2) the trial court erred in failing to hold a formal 
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competency hearing. Accordingly, the trial court properly refused to readjudicate 
these issues (R. 261-64; Addendum C).10 
During the evidentiary hearing on the first post-conviction petition filed 
in Third District Court, defendant litigated the issue of his competency to plead guilty 
(R. 159-201, 203-04). The Third District Court, on post-conviction review, 
specifically concluded that defendant was competent to enter his guilty pleas (|<±). 
On appeal, this Court affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief and held that the 
trial court did not err in failing to hold a competency hearing prior to defendant 
pleading guilty. See York. 875 P.2d at 597. Since these issues have been 
previously adjudicated adversely to defendant, res judicata and collateral estoppel 
bar defendant from relitigating them. See Salt Lake Citizens Congress v. Mountain 
States Tel. & Tel. Co.. 846 P.2d 1245, 1251 (Utah 1992) (res judicata prevents 
relitigation of issues previously determined); Malone v. Parker. 826 P.2d 132, 136 
(Utah 1992) (collateral estoppel bars readjudication of any issue decided in a prior 
action). See also Burleigh v. Turner. 388 P.2d 412 (Utah 1964) (res judicata applies 
to habeas corpus actions); Tillman v. Cook. 855 P.2d 211,214 (Utah 1993) (issues 
10ln his brief, defendant claims that the trial court erred in refusing to 
relitigate the issue of trial counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to pursue additional 
mental testing (Br. of App. at 9). However, the trial court took evidence and made 
findings on this issue (R. 331, 404-412, 457). 
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raised and litigated in a prior post-conviction petition may not be readjudicated, 
absent unusual circumstances). 
Additionally, although a motion to withdraw a guilty plea and a petition 
for post-conviction relief are "separate and distinct procedures," Hurst v. Cook. 777 
P.2d 1029, 1037 n. 8 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court has nevertheless 
concluded that as a species of post-conviction remedy, a motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea is subject to the same successiveness limitations as set forth in rule 65B, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure (currently rule 65C and Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-101 et 
seq. (1996)). See State v. West. 765 P.2d 891, 893-95 (Utah 1988). The purpose 
of the post-conviction rule requiring that all claims be raised in a single proceeding 
absent a showing of unusual circumstances "was fashioned to prevent abuse by 
prisoners who burden the courts and frustrate the ends of justice by trying to keep 
cases alive indefinitely." Wright v. Carver. 886 P.2d 58, 60 (Utah 1994) (citations 
omitted). 
Furthermore, such a rule would prevent disparate treatment in the 
review of post-conviction claims raised by defendants who plead guilty as opposed 
to those who are convicted after a trial. Otherwise, defendants who plead guilty 
have unlimited opportunities to challenge their pleas by filing repeated motions to 
withdraw (or, as in this case, a motion to withdraw following two post-conviction 
petitions), while defendants who have been convicted following a trial have limited 
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available post-conviction remedies. See generally rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-101 et. seq. (1996). Finally, such a rule would 
prevent a defendant who pleads guilty from circumventing the rules governing post-
conviction petitions merely by labeling his pleading as a "motion to withdraw" 
(indeed, as defendant has done here). Therefore, this Court should affirm the trial 
court's proper refusal to relitigate defendant's competency claims. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT 
DEFENDANT RECEIVED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL AND, THEREFORE, THAT NO GOOD 
CAUSE EXISTED WARRANTING WITHDRAWAL OF 
DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEAS 
In order to prevail on his claims of ineffective counsel, defendant must 
demonstrate that: (1) specific acts or omissions fall outside the wide range of 
professionally competent assistance; and (2) counsel's deficient performance 
prejudiced the outcome of the proceeding. State v. Frame. 723 P.2d 401,405 (Utah 
1986) (citing Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). To satisfy the first of 
the two prongs, defendant must demonstrate that counsel's "representation fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland. 466 U.S. at 688. This 
requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious that he was not functioning 
as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Id- Accord 
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State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). However, the court will not 
second-guess counsel's legitimate strategic choices, regardless of how flawed those 
choices might appear in retrospect. Strickland. 466 U.S. at 689. Defendant must 
therefore overcome the strong presumption that counsel's performance fell "within 
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." id- See also State v. Dunn. 
850 P.2d 1201, 1225 (Utah 1993); State v. Wood. 648 P.2d 71, 91 (Utah), cert. 
denied. 459 U.S. 988 (1982). 
In order to satisfy the second prong of the Strickland standard, 
defendant must show that he was actually prejudiced by any alleged 
unreasonableness. To meet this criteria, defendant must demonstrate that there is 
a reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different. Strickland. 466 U.S. at 694; Dunn. 850 P.2d at 1225. In 
the context of a guilty plea, defendant must demonstrate that "there is a reasonable 
probability that but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would 
have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart. 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (emphasis 
added). See also Parsons v. Barnes. 871 P.2d 516, 525 (Utah), cert, denied. 115 
S. Ct. 431 (1994). The purpose of requiring a demonstration of prejudice from 
defendants who challenge the validity of their guilty pleas on the ground of 
ineffective counsel, is to maintain the "fundamental interest in the finality of guilty 
pleas." Hill, 474 U.S. at 58. 
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A reviewing court need not address both parts of the Strickland test if 
defendant fails to meet his burden on one. See Parsons. 871 P.2d at 523 (citing 
Strickland. 466 U.S. at 697). Accord State v. Carter. 776 P.2d 886,893 (Utah 1989); 
Bundv v. DeLand. 763 P.2d 803, 805-06 (Utah 1988). Defendant has failed to 
demonstrate either deficient performance or prejudice. 
In the district court, defendant claimed that trial counsel was ineffective 
in the following ways: (1) counsel induced defendant to plead guilty and advised 
defendant to "just go along with the system" in order to help restore defendant's 
memory; (2) counsel told defendant that if defendant "went along with the system," 
he would go to the Utah State Hospital; (3) counsel failed to procure additional 
psychological testing; (4) counsel had a conflict of interest and aligned himself with 
the State by endorsing a check for defendant's defense over to another individual 
and informing defendant that he had no money for a defense; (5) counsel did not 
allow defendant to decide whether to withdraw his previous pleas of not guilty by 
reason of insanity; and (6) counsel failed to object to the presentence report being 
written by the prosecutor's wife. 
A. Guilty pleas 
Defendant claims that Diumenti coerced him into pleading guilty by 
telling defendant: (1) to just "go along with the system;" (2) that defendant would go 
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to the state hospital instead of prison; and (3) that pleading guilty was the only way 
defendant would receive treatment. The record refutes all of defendant's claims. 
Diumenti discussed with defendant the possible outcome if defendant 
went to trial, the strength of the State's case, the benefit of pleading guilty to the 
reduced offenses, the elements of the amended charges, and the evidence 
supporting the statutory elements (R. 332, 417,419). Diumenti was confident that 
defendant understood the elements of the offenses, and he would never advise a 
client to plead guilty if he thought that they truly did not understand the plea 
proceedings and the facts that they were admitting (R. 458, 533). Diumenti never 
told defendant during the plea proceeding (or in preparation for the plea hearing) that 
in order to restore his memory, defendant had to "just go along with the system" (R. 
332,417-18). Diumenti has never used that phrase and finds it "repulsive," at least 
in a pre-incarceration setting (R. 418). Finally, Diumenti never told defendant that, 
as a condition of the plea agreement, defendant would only go to the state hospital 
(R. 418). Defendant alone decided to accept the plea agreement; Diumenti did not 
force him (R. 332, 334,459). Defendant never insisted upon going to trial (R. 332). 
The foregoing demonstrates that the trial court correctly concluded that 
defendant failed to prove that Diumenti was constitutionally deficient (R. 334). 
Therefore, the trial court appropriately declined to address prejudice (R. 334). 
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Nevertheless, the fact that defendant never insisted upon going to trial (R. 332) 
negates the requisite prejudice. See Hill. 474 U.S. at 59; Parsons. 871 P.2d at 525. 
B. Additional Psychological Testing 
Defendant claims that Diumenti was deficient for failing to procure a 
third mental health professional to examine defendant regarding his competence to 
stand trial and his mental state at the time of the offense (Br. of App. at 26-37).11 
As noted previously, Lindsley was primarily responsible for determining 
what if any mental defenses applied to defendant (R. 386).12 However, Diumenti 
and Lindsley discussed the mental health issues many times and tried to reconcile 
the opinions of Drs. Ghicadus and Kimball with the state of the law (R. 386-87). 
Lindsley told Diumenti that he had reviewed this information with defendant (icl). 
Diumenti discussed with Lindsley the possibility of discrepancies in the two reports 
that would justify getting a third expert, however, they ultimately concluded that it 
would not have been in defendant's best interest to hire a third expert (R. 404,410, 
11For the first time on appeal, defendant also claims that the trial court 
erred in failing to order additional mental health experts to determine defendant's 
mental state at the time of the offense (Br. of App. at 11-21). However, in the trial 
court, defendant raised this issue only in terms of ineffective counsel (R. 71-72). 
Since defendant does not argue plain error, this Court should decline to consider 
this claim in terms of trial court error. See Monson v. Carver. 928 P.2d 1017, 
1022 (Utah 1996); State v. Lopez. 886 P.2d 1105,1113 (Utah 1994); State v. 
Schweitzer. 943 P.2d 649, 655 n. 3 (Utah App. 1997). 
12Defendant does not challenge Lindsley's effectiveness. 
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457). Diumenti did not tell defendant that he would obtain additional experts; he 
simply advised defendant that if more experts were necessary, defendant would 
have to retain them (R. 408-09). Eventually, Diumenti told defendant that it was not 
in defendant's best interest to undergo further testing and that no additional expert 
would be used (R. 410-412). 
Although Diumenti originally filed a notice of intent to present an insanity 
or mental health defense, after reviewing the case and the doctors' reports, he did 
not see any facts that would support an insanity defense (R. 387-88, 455-56). 
Diumenti personally advised defendant not to pursue such a defense in light of the 
doctors' reports (R. 387). The preliminary hearing evidence and the doctors' reports 
convinced Diumenti that the State's evidence supported the charges (R. 475-76). 
After discussing the possible plea agreement which was in defendant's best interest, 
defendant told Diumenti to withdraw the insanity defense (R. 389).13 Diumenti 
explained to defendant the ramifications of withdrawing the insanity defense (R. 
390). 
Defendant claims that Diumenti's request for a 90-day evaluation prior 
to sentencing demonstrates that further testing could have benefitted defendant (Br. 
of App. at 31-32). During the sentencing hearing, Diumenti referred to the mental 
13On appeal, defendant claims that he was not aware that the insanity 
defense had been withdrawn (Br. of App. at 16). The trial court's findings refute 
defendant's assertion (R. 331). 
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health reports in requesting a 90-day evaluation (Sentencing Transcript [hereinafter 
Sent. Tr.] at 10),14 however, at this point in the proceedings, he was simply 
attempting to avoid the consecutive sentences recommended by Adult Probation 
and Parole [hereinafter AP&P] (idj. Diumenti argued that the experts' reports noted 
a "possibility" not a "probability" that defendant had some "medically discoverable 
and treatable brain injury;" he did not argue or infer that defendant was incompetent 
or insane (Sent. Tr. at 10-11). 
Defendant has failed to demonstrate any deficiency in Diumenti's 
strategic decision to forego additional testing. Furthermore, defendant has not 
proven prejudice. Although, subsequent to defendant's pleas, the post-conviction 
court determined that defendant suffered from MPD at the time he pled guilty, the 
court ultimately concluded that defendant was nevertheless competent to stand trial 
(R. 204). Concerning defendant's mental state at the time of the offense, Dr. 
Ghicadus opined that defendant's alleged amnesia made it virtually impossible to 
retrospectively determine defendant's state of mind at the time of the offense (R. 
126). Dr. Kimball determined that defendant, who was "faking bad and faking sick," 
was able to recognize right from wrong and that there was no medical evidence of 
14Appellee did not receive the sentencing transcript from this Court as part 
of the record below. However, the transcript had been prepared prior to the 
hearing on defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas and is part of the 
official record. Since appellee does not have the record pages, counsel will refer 
to the pages of the individual transcript. 
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a dissociative state that would reduce defendant's capacity to control his impulses 
(R. 129,132). Accordingly, defendant has failed to demonstrate that with additional 
testing he would have insisted upon going to trial, facing capital homicide and 
attempted second degree murder charges. 
C. Conflict of interest 
A Sixth Amendment claim "grounded on a conflict of interest is a special 
subtype of an ineffectiveness claim." State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65, 72 (Utah App. 
1990). A defendant who did not object to the conflict prior to trial has the burden on 
appeal of demonstrating with specificity that "an actual conflict of interest existed 
which adversely affected his [or her] lawyer's performance." Webb. 790 P.2d at 73 
(quoting Cuvler v. Sullivan. 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980)); Zepp. 748 F.2d at 135-36 
(citing Wood v. Georgia. 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981)). See ajso State v. Taylor. 947 
P.2d 681, 686 (Utah 1997) ("defendant must demonstrate as a threshold matter.. 
. that the defense attorney was required to make a choice advancing his own 
interests to the detriment of his client's interests). If the defendant makes such a 
showing, prejudice need not be demonstrated to prevail on the claim. Cuvler. 446 
U.S. at 349-50, 100 S. Ct. at 1718-19; Webb, 790 P.2d at 73. The court will 
presume the defendant was prejudiced by the lawyer's performance. United States 
v. Cronic. 466 U.S. 648, 658,104 S. Ct. 2039, 2046 (1984); Webb. 790 P.2d at 73 
(quoting Strickland. 466 U.S. at 692). 
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Defendant claims that Diumenti had a conflict of interest because: (1) 
Diumenti misappropriated funds designated for defendant's bail; and (2) Diumenti 
stated during the sentencing hearing that defendant "isn't going somewhere in either 
event" (Br. of App. at 36-40). 
1. Bail Money 
Defendant claims that Diumenti misappropriated $14,000 which was 
supposed to be used for defendant's bail (Br. of App. at 38). Defendant premises 
his claim on the affidavits of Patricia Minick-York (defendant's ex-daughter-in-law) 
and Mary Minick-Peterson (defendant's ex-daughter-in-law's mother) (jdj. The trial 
court received as evidence a stipulation which contained the "testimony" of Ms. Mary 
Minick and Ms. Patricia Minick-York (R. 319-20; Addendum D).15 Essentially, if 
called to testify, Ms. Minick-York and Ms. Minick-Peterson would say that they gave 
Mr. Diumenti a check for $14,000 to be used for defendant's bail (R. 319-20). The 
check was made payable to Ms. Minick-Peterson, who never endorsed the check 
over to anyone (id). Diumenti recalled that he and Lindsley were a conduit for either 
Dave Randall or some other third party regarding approximately $15,000 to be used 
for defendant's bail, however, nobody ever gave Diumenti any money (R. 398-99, 
412). By concluding that no evidence supported defendant's claim of a conflict of 
15Appendix L attached to defendant's brief contains an incorrect version of 
the stipulation that the parties admitted as evidence and, therefore, should be 
stricken. Compare R. 319-20; Addendum D, with defendant's Appendix L. 
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interest based upon the $14,000, the trial court implicitly found Diumenti more 
credible than defendant, Ms. Minick-York, and Ms. Minick-Peterson (R. 333).16 The 
trial court properly exercised its prerogative in this regard, and this Court should 
defer to the trial court's assessment of the witnesses. See Casida v. DeLand. 866 
P.2d 599, 601, 602 (Utah App. 1993) (district court has the prerogative to judge 
credibility of witnesses and determine facts). Accord State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 
936 (Utah 1994) (the trial court is in the best position to assess witness credibility 
and derive a sense of the proceeding as a whole). 
2. Sentencing Hearing Statements 
Relying on State v. Holland. 876 P.2d 357 (Utah 1994), defendant next 
alleges that Diumenti's statements during the sentencing hearing demonstrate a 
conflict of interest (Br. of App. at 36). Defendant claims that Diumenti's statement 
that defendant "isn't going somewhere in either event" demonstrates that Diumenti 
had aligned himself with the prosecution and was not upholding his duty of loyalty 
to defendant (kL). Defendant takes this quote out of context, and in any event, it 
does not demonstrate a lack of loyalty on Diumenti's part. 
AP&P recommended consecutive prison terms for defendant. During 
the sentencing hearing, Diumenti asked the trial court to stay a prison term and 
16Even if true, the statements of Ms. Minick-Peterson and Ms. Minick-York 
do not prove that Diumenti misappropriated any funds. Ms. Minick-York never 
endorsed the $14,000 check, which was payable only to her (R. 319). 
36 
place defendant on probation (Sent. Tr. at 9-10). Alternatively, Diumenti asked the 
trial court to order a 90-day diagnostic evaluation to assist the court in a thorough 
understanding of defendant's circumstances (Sent. Tr. at 10). Assuming that the 
trial court would send defendant to prison (the only issue being concurrent versus 
consecutive sentences), Diumenti argued that a 90-day evaluation was available and 
appropriate since defendant would be serving at least some prison time (id at 10-
11). Diumenti's statement that defendant "wasn't going somewhere" simply reflected 
his recognition that the trial court would most likely sentence defendant to prison. 
Diumenti informed defendant that he was probably going to prison — the only 
question was for how long (R. 534, 537). Diumenti's statement certainly does not 
constitute a lack of loyalty toward defendant, as he did not take a position contrary 
to defendant's best interests. Cf Holland. 876 P.2d at 360 (counsel breached duty 
of loyalty by asserting, in an unrelated proceeding, that his client was a "prime 
candidate for the death penalty"). Rather, Diumenti aggressively urged the trial court 
not to sentence defendant to prison immediately, without the benefit of an additional 
evaluation. If Diumenti had been acting as the State's ally, he would have concurred 
with AP&P's recommendation for consecutive sentences. 
Since the record is devoid of an actual conflict of interest which affected 
Diumenti's representation of defendant, this Court should affirm the trial court's 
ruling. 
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D. Presentence Report 
Defendant claims that Diumenti's strategic choice to have Ms. Wilson 
conduct the presentence investigation was not in defendant's best interest (Br. of 
App. at 40-43). Defendant also alleges that Diumenti failed to discuss the 
presentence report with him (jd. at 43-47). Even if defendant's claims were true, 
they could not affect the propriety of his guilty pleas that he entered approximately 
two months prior to sentencing. 
1. Sue Wilson 
Defendant does not challenge Diumenti's testimony or the trial court's 
finding that Diumenti strategically chose Ms. Wilson to prepare the presentence 
report. Rather, defendant claims that this strategic choice was deficient because 
Ms. Wilson was obviously biased against defendant (Br. of App. at 41 -2). Defendant 
presented no evidence of any bias on Ms. Wilson's part, and the record fully 
supports the trial court's finding that defendant, after being fully informed of Ms. 
Wilson's relationship to Mel Wilson, acquiesced to Ms. Wilson's preparation of the 
presentence report (R. 332-33, 512). Reviewing courts accord great deference to 
counsel's trial strategy. See Strickland. 466 U.S. at 689 (the court should not 
second-guess counsel's legitimate strategic choices, regardless of how flawed those 
choices might appear in retrospect). Defendant has failed to show any flaw in 
Diumenti's decision or any error in the presentence report. 
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2. Review of Presentence Report 
Defendant alleges that Diumenti failed to review the presentence report 
with him, and that as a result, defendant was unaware of alleged errors until many 
years later (Br. of App. at 43-44). The presentence report was available for 
defendant to review, and Diumenti recalled that Lindsley discussed the report with 
defendant (R. 424-25). Therefore, defendant suffered no constitutional violation. 
See State v. Lipskv. 608 P.2d 1241, 1247-48 (Utah 1980) (trial court need only 
disclose presentence report to defendant prior to sentencing). Cf. State v. Casarez. 
656 P.2d 1005, 1008 (Utah 1982) (defendant entitled to be resentenced where he 
requested and was denied access to presentence report). 
Despite his opportunity to do so, defendant declined to address the trial 
court at sentencing (Sent. Tr. at 11). Defendant now describes several alleged 
errors contained in the presentence report,17 however, during the evidentiary hearing 
on the motion to withdraw, defendant neither argued nor presented evidence of any 
presentence report inaccuracies (R. 333). Accordingly, this Court should decline to 
review the alleged errors. See James v. Preston. 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah App. 
"Defendant also claims that the presentence report failed to mention that 
the fingerprints of Jeff Longhurst and an unknown person were found on the gun, 
while defendant's were not (Br. of App. at 44). Defendant's claim is directly 
refuted by the record. At the preliminary hearing, Detective Steven Gray of the 
Utah Crime Lab testified that he was unable to find any legible prints on the gun 
(P.H.Tr. at 186). 
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1987)(mere mention of issue in pleadings, when no supporting evidence is 
introduced at trial, is insufficient to raise the issue at trial and fails to preserve issue 
for appeal). 
Since defendant failed to prove that Diumenti was ineffective, no good 
cause exists warranting withdrawal of defendant's guilty pleas. Utah Code Ann. § 
77-24-3 (1953). See also State v. Galleaos. 738 P.2d 1040, 1041 (Utah 1987) 
(withdrawal of guilty plea is a privilege, not a right, and is left to the sound discretion 
of the trial court). Therefore, this Court should affirm the trial court's ruling. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED 
WITH RULE 111N ACCEPTING DEFENDANT'S GUILTY 
PLEAS AND, THEREFORE, NO GOOD CAUSE EXISTS 
WARRANTING WITHDRAWAL OF DEFENDANT'S 
GUILTY PLEAS 
Since defendant entered his guilty pleas prior to the Utah Supreme 
Court's decision in State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), the strict 
compliance standard of Gibbons does not apply. See Stilling. 856 P.2d at 671; 
Blair. 868 P.2d at 805. In cases decided prior to Gibbons, a guilty plea was knowing 
and voluntary if the trial court demonstrated substantial compliance with Rule 11. 
See State v. Stilling. 856 P.2d 666, 671 (Utah App. 1993); Willett v. Barnes. 842 
P.2d 860, 861 (Utah 1992); State v. Hoff. 814 P.2d 1119,1123-24 (Utah 1991). A 
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reviewing court, in determining whether there was substantial compliance with rule 
11, must look at the "record as a whole" in order to determine whether a guilty plea 
was knowingly and voluntarily given. See State v. Vasilacopulos. 756 P.2d 92, 94 
(Utah App. 1988), cert, denied 765 P.2d 1278 (1988). Additionally, the failure to 
make a specific finding under Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-11 (1984)18 is not critical if 
the record as a whole establishes that defendant entered his pleas with full 
knowledge and an understanding of the consequences and rights he was waiving. 
See Jolivet v. Cook. 784 P.2d 1148,1149 (Utah 1989). 
The Plea Colloquy 
During the change of plea hearing, the court clerk handed a copy of the 
amended information to defendant and read the charges aloud in open court (R. 
141a).19 Although defendant claimed that he had no memory of the shootings, he 
agreed with Diumenti's assessment that if the matter had gone to trial, the facts 
probably would have lead to a first or second degree murder conviction, and for that 
reason, defendant desired to plead guilty (R. 140-141). Defendant agreed that he 
was pleading guilty because he believed that he "in fact engaged in the conduct," 
^Superseded by Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e). 
19The amended information alleged that on June 17, 1984, in Bountiful, 
Utah, defendant intentionally or knowingly caused the death of Jeff Longhurst 
(count 1); and attempted to cause the death of Patricia York, under the influence 
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable 
explanation (count 2) (R. 50). 
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and because he wanted to "get this over with" (R. 143-44). The trial court explained 
that by pleading guilty, defendant was waiving his right to a jury trial, his right to call 
witnesses and to require the State to call witnesses, and his right to force the State 
to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury of defendant's peers (R. 
142). The trial court advised defendant of the possible maximum sentences for each 
charge, and informed defendant that the court was not bound by any sentencing 
recommendations (R. 141a, 142a). At the conclusion of the plea colloquy, the trial 
court found that defendant knowingly pled guilty to both counts in the amended 
information (R. 144).20 
The Trial Court Record 
In addition to the plea colloquy, defendant was present during the two-
day preliminary hearing at which the following evidence was presented: (1) 
defendant called Pat York's house on June 17, 1984 and told Anita that if Jeff 
Longhurst was within 50 miles of defendant he would hunt Longhurst down and kill 
him;21 (2) later that same evening, defendant entered Pat York's house and walked 
20Defendant claims that the trial court erred because it failed to find that he 
voluntarily pled guilty (Br. of App. at 21-22). The failure to make this finding is not 
prejudicial since the record as a whole demonstrates that defendant was fully 
aware of the consequences of pleading guilty and of the rights that he was 
waiving. See Jolivet. 784 P.2d at 1149. 
21P.H.Tr. at 103-114. 
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past Anita's bedroom with a gun in his right hand; (3) Anita heard several 
gunshots;23 (4) Anita walked into Pat York's bedroom where she saw Longhurst on 
the floor;24 (5) defendant slammed another magazine into the gun, wrestled 
Longhurst out in the hallway, and eventually shot Longhurst three more times while 
Anita was calling 911 ;25 (6) while struggling with defendant, Longhurst said "Donald, 
you son-of-a-bitch, you hurt her again;"26 (7) Anita saw a bullet wound in Pat York's 
neck;27 and (8) while Anita was still on the 911 call, defendant burst into the police 
dispatch room and said, "I'm the man you want . . . I'm the one that did the 
shooting."28 This evidence is more than sufficient to form a factual basis for 
defendant's guilty pleas. See Willett v. Barnes. 842 P.2d 860, 861 (Utah 1992). 
The foregoing illustrates that defendant pled guilty after being fully 
informed of the consequences of pleading guilty, of his constitutional rights, and of 
22P.H. Tr. at 128-29. 
23P.H. Tr. at 130. 
24P.H. Tr. at 132-33. 
25P.H.Tr. at 134-36. 
26P.H.Tr. at 141. 
27P.H. Tr. at 134-35. 
28P.H. Tr. at 73-74. 
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the factual basis for his pleas. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, warranting affirmance of 
the trial court's ruling. See Blair. 868 P.2d at 805; Gardner. 844 P.2d at 294. 
CONCLUSION 
The foregoing demonstrates that: the trial court properly declined to 
address defendant's previously litigated claims; defendant's trial counsel was 
constitutionally effective; the trial court substantially complied with rule 11 in 
accepting defendant's guilty pleas; and defendant has failed to establish good cause 
warranting withdrawal of his pleas. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the trial 
court's order denying defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this [S^dav of June, 1998. 
ANGELA F. MICKLOS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Criminal Appeals Division 
29Defendant claims that the record lacks evidence of an intent to kill. 
Defendant overlooks the following facts: (a) that he vowed to hunt down and kill 
Longhurst (R. 327; Addendum B)(P.H. Tr. at 103-114); and (b) that defendant 
reloaded the gun during the shootings (P.H. Tr. at 134-36). 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, this. of June, 1998 to: 
Donald William York 
Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in holding that the 
initial stop v i s legal. The trial court's find-
ings with respect to standing (under the 
abandonment theory) and consent are there-
fore inadequate. 
We vacate the trial court's ruling and re-
mand the case for further proceedings eon* 
gistent with this opinion. 
BILLINGS and GREENWOOD, JJ., 
concur. 
Donald W. YORK, Petitioner 
and Appellant, 
Kenneth V. SHULSEX, 
et i l n Respondents 
and Appellees. 
No. 920376-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
May 26, 1994. 
Rehearing Denied June 20, 1994. 
Petitioner, who pleaded guilty to second-
degree murder and attempted manslaughter, 
filed petition for writ of habeas corpus.^  The 
Third District Court, Sah Lake County, Pat 
B. Brian, J., denied petition. Petitioner ap-
pealed. The Court of Appeals, Billings, P Jn 
held that (1) information known to trial 
court at time of plea hearing did not indicate 
trial judge would have had bona fide doubt 
with respect to petitioner's competency to 
plead guilty so as to require sua iponte 
determination on competency, and (2) peti-
tioner did not meet his burden to marshal 
evidence on claim that habeas court erred by 
finding be was competent at time he entered 
guilty plea. 
Affirmed. 
L Habeas Corpus ^ W 4 
When reviewing appeal from dismissal 
of habeas corpus petition, Court of Appeals 
surveys record in light most favorable to 
findings and judgment 
1 Habeas Corpus *»276 
Petitioner was not required to bring mo-
tion to withdraw guilty pies before filing 
petition for habeas corpus in which he al-
leged that trial court should hive made find-
ing regarding his competency before accept-
ing change of plea to guilty. 
1 Criminal Law +»1028, 1030(1) 
Court of Appeals will not consider issues 
raised for first time on appeal absent plain 
error or exceptional circumstances. 
4. Criminal Law e*l028 
Issue is preserved for appeal when party 
timely brings issue to attention of trial court, 
thus providing court an opportunity to rule 
on issue's merits. 
5. Habeas Corpus ^816 
Issue of whether plea-taking court 
ahould have made competency inquiry before 
accepting petitioner's guilty plea was proper-
ly preserved for appeal in habeas proceeding; 
although all of legal arguments developed os 
appeal may not have been articulated below, 
underlying issue was clearly before hsbess 
court, as were facts upon which petitioner 
relied on appeal. 
& Constitutional Law *»26&2(2) 
Due process requires that defendant be 
competent to plead guilt}-. U.S.CA Const 
Amends. 6, 14. 
?. Constitutional Law *»265£ 
To protect defendant's due process 
fights, guilty pies must be voluntarily and 
knowingly made. US.CA. ConsuAmends. 6, 
14. 
t Criminal Law **273(2) 
Test for competency to plead guilty ii 
the same as competency to stand trial 
* * > 
whether defendant has 
tbHi:.\ to consult with his or her lawyer with 
msonable degree of rational understanding 
md has rational as well as factual under-
binding of proceedings against him or her. 
i Criminal Law ^1134(2) 
In determining whether trial court 
thcdd have had doubts as to defendant's 
competency in entering plea and whether 
jodge should have made sua tponte compe-
tency determination, appellate court may 
consider only those facts that were before 
roan when plea was entered. 
10. Criminal Law *»2?3(2) 
Information known to trial court at time 
of plea hearing did not indicate that trial 
judge should have had bona fide doubt with 
respect to defendant's competency to plead 
guilty and, therefore, trial court did not err 
& failing to investigate whether defendant 
wis competent to enter plea of guilty to 
second-degree murder and attempted man-
slaughter, transcript of guilty plea hearing 
lacked any statement or occurrence indicat-
ing that defendant was acting other than in 
entire)}' rational manner, defendant an-
swered all questions without any apparent 
hesitation or lack of comprehension, and ex-
aminers of defendant diagnosed him as suf-
fering from borderline personality disorder 
but neither evaluation indicated that he was 
not competent to plead guilty and in fact 
both examinations showed defendant to be 
without psychoses or serious mental prob-
lems. 
1L Criminal Law #-273(2) 
Mere filing of notice to rely on defense 
«f insanity was not sufficient to require com-
petency hearing before accepting guilty plea. 
U Criminal Law m*Z7M) 
Defendant with amnesia is not per se 
incompetent to plead guilty; defendant may 
(bad guilt}* although he or she has no recol-
YORK y. SHULSEN Utah 591 
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•ufficient present lection of incident for which he or she is 
charged. 
13. Criminal Law «»273(2) 
Whether amnesia renders a defendant 
incompetent is evaluated on a ease-by-case 
basis and in taking a guilty plea under such 
circumstances, courts look to fairness of pro-
ceeding as affected by defendant's amnesia, 
and defendant cannot plead guilty if fairness 
of proceeding is compromised. 
14. Criminal Law ^l lSS( l ) 
Competency is a factual issue reviewed 
for dear error. Rules CrvProc, Rule 62(a). 
15. Habeas Corpus «»705.1 
If habeas corpus petition raises ques-
tions of fact, it is petitioner's burden to show 
the judgment was clearly erroneous. Rules 
CrvProc-, Rule 52(a). 
16. Habeas Corpus +»824 
As a prerequisite to attack on findings of 
fact in habeas proceeding, petitioner must 
marshal all evidence in support of findings 
and demonstrate that evidence, including all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom is in-
sufficient to support findings; this marshal-
ing requirement provides appellate court 
with basis from which to conduct meaningful 
and expedient review of facts challenged on 
appeal. 
17. Habeas Corpus *»824 
Habeas petitioner failed to meet his bur-
den to marshal evidence on claim that trial 
court erred in finding him competent at time 
he entered plea of guilt}* to second-degree 
murder and attempted manslaughter; rath-
er, he merely reargued evidence most favor-
able to him, leaving it to Court of Appeals to 
•art out what evidence actually supported 
habeas court's competency determination. 
Jerold D. McPhee, Salt Lake City (ar-
gued), for appellant 
Marian Decker (argued), Christine F. Sol-
tia, and Jan Graham, Salt Lake City, for 
appellees. 
Before BILLINGS, DAVIS, and ORME, 
JJ. 
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OPINION 
BILLINGS, Pmiding Judge: 
Petitioner Donald W. York appeals from 
the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus. We affirm. 
FACTS 
II] When reviewing an appeal from a 
dismissal of a habeas corpus petition, " "we 
survey the record in the light most fivorable 
to the findings and judgment*" Bundy v. 
IkUrtA 763 ?2d 803,805 (Utah 1988) (quot-
ing Velasquez v. Pratt, 21 Utah 2d 229, 232, 
443 PJZd 1020, 1022 (1968)). We recite the 
facts accordingly. On June 17, 1984, peti-
tioner purchased with cash an airline ticket 
to fly from California to Salt Lake City un-
der the name of Dan Hill. After arriving in 
Salt Lake Dty later that day, he rented a car 
using the name Donald York and drove di-
rectly to the home of his ex-wife, Patricia 
York. Petitioner entered his ex-wife's home 
armed with a loaded gun, went to her bed-
room and fired twelve to fourteen times, 
seriously wounding her and killing Jeff 
Longhurst 
After the shootings, petitioner surrendered 
himself to the Bountiful pobce. He told offi-
cers that there had been a fight at Patricia 
York's residence and asked whether his ex-
wife and Longhurst were alive. He also told 
the pobce where to find the gun and shells, 
and that for what he had done he was going 
to heU and could no longer be a member of 
his church. 
Petitioner was charged with first degree 
murder, a capital offense, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. I 7&-&-202 (1984), attempted sec-
ond degree murder, a second degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. H 76-5-203 
(1979) and 76-1-102 (1983), and aggravated 
burglary, a first degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. I 76-6-203 (1978).1 Peti-
tioner pled not guilty. 
Hereafter, petitioner tendered a notice of 
defense claiming that be was not guOty by 
reason of insanity or that he had diminished 
mental capacity at the time the offense oc-
curred under Utah Code Ann. i 77-14*8 
I. The burglary charge was subsequently dis* 
(1990). As a consequence, the court appoint. 
td Dr. Chris Ghicadus, M.D. and Dr. Hebe 
C. Kimball, PhD., of the Davis Count) Mea-
tal Health Center, "to examine the defends: 
and investigate his mental condition" 
Dr. Ghicadus examined defendant and con-
duded that be was "mental]}' competent to 
understand trial proceedings and would be 
able to assist in his defense " Further, be 
diagnosed petitioner as having borderline 
personality disorder, meaning that petitioner 
was "not <msane' in a legal sense of the word, 
is not psychotic in a psychiatric sense, but 
has variances and neurotic traits that do DO! 
aeriously interfere with [his] everyday Kit* 
Similarly, Dr. Kimball concluded thai 
"there is no medical history or evidence d 
any fugue or dissociative states which woulc 
have reduced his capacity to control his m 
pulses at the time of the alleged crime," asc 
that "[hfc shows no signs of any psychoses 
illogical thinbng delusions or hallucinations 
His train of thought appears to be normal1 
Both doctors suggested further testing fa 
order to state firmly why petitioner had pen 
ods of memory lapse. 
Pursuant to a plea bargain, petitioner pled 
guilt}* to reduced charges of second degree 
murder, a first degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. i 76-6-203 (1979), and at-
tempted manslaughter, a third degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. { 76-6-205 
(19S5). At the plea hearing, petinoner 
claimed he had no specific memory of the 
shootings, however, he indicated that never-
theiess he desired to accept the plea agree-
ment and plead guilty to both shootings. 
The trial court accepted his plea without 
formally inquiring into his competency, find-
ing he "knowingly entered his plea of guilty" 
to both counts. 
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel 
requested a ninety-day diagnostic evaluation 
to investigate the "possibility that can't be 
discounted, that Mr. York does have some 
. . . medically discoverable and treatable 
brain injury." Prior to sentencing, the court 
asked if there was any known reason «ty 
sentence should not be imposed, to which 
defense counsel responded negatively. With-
misted. 
\ ^ 
tot inquiring into his competency, the court 
Iben sentenced petitioner to five years to life 
Icr the first offense and to zero to five years 
Jbr the second offense, to be served consecu-
thth' at the Utah State Prison. 
At the Prison, petitioner was examined and 
vested by Dr. Alms Carlisle, PhD., the pris-
*t psychologist. Dr. Carlisle conducted sev-
en) hypno&s/therapy sessions with petition-
er in 1985 and ultimately diagnosed him as 
taring multiple personality disorder (MPD). 
to other personality was identified as Dan 
As s result of the MPD diagnosis, petition-
er filed s petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
m April 2, 1985. Petitioner did cot move to 
wuhdrsw his guilty plea or otherwise directly 
appeal his conviction. In February 1990, the 
trial eom granted petitioner's motion for the 
ippointmem of a psychiatric expert to evalu-
ate petitioner's "mental condition at the time 
kit pka was entered," and appointed Dr. 
Aim E. Jeppsen, MIX, to evaluate him in 
preparation for a bearing on the habeas cor-
pus petition. 
An evidentiary hearing on the petition was 
kid on July 3,1991, at which petitioner, Dr. 
Carlisle, and Dr. Jeppsen testified. Petition-
r diimed that he could not recall the details 
•f the shootings or the entry of his guilty 
pleas. He further testified that be pled 
fuihy on the advice of counsel with the un-
derstanding that this was the only way he 
could get treatment for his alleged amnesia. 
Dr. Carlisle testified that although petitioner 
probably suffered from MPD at the time of 
the shootings and his plea, he was neverthe-
less competent to have pled guilty. Dr. Car-
lisle explained that petitioner would have 
been able to think rationally, form a mental 
state of intent to loll, understand the nature 
tf the proceedings and the nature of the 
et&es, and assist his attorney. Thus, be 
concluded that petitioner was competent to 
ester a guilty plea to the abootings. Dr. 
Jtppsen agreed with Dr. Carlisle's diagnosis 
«f MPD; however, be testified that petitioner 
*TKld not have been competent to plead 
fuOty because of this psychiatric disorder. 
X totfoner's airline ticket to Sah Lake City on 
*e da\ of the shootings b recorded under the 
YORK v. SHULSEN 
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The court denied the petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus, finding that although petition-
er suffered from MPD at the time of the 
crimes and his plea, he was competent to 
plead guilt)*. Petitioner appeals the court's 
denial, arguing: (1) the trial court should 
have made a finding regarding his competen-
cy before accepting his change of plea to 
guilty; and (2) the habeas court erred in 
finding be was competent when be entered 
his guilty plea. 
[2] TT}o successfully attack a guDty plea 
collaterally, a petitioner must demonstrate an 
obvious injustice or a substantial and prejudi-
cial denial of a constitutional right in the 
reception of the plea and must show cause 
why he or she took no direct appeal." Sum-
mers t>. Cook 759 P,2d 841, 843 (Utah App. 
1988); accord Solazar t>. Warden, 852 ?2d 
988, 991 (Utah 1993). Petitioner did sot 
directly appeal his conviction because the 
time for appeal had lapsed by the time he 
was diagnosed with MPD, and the Sute does 
sot contend that as a result we should refuse 
to bear his petition. We further note that 
petitioner was not required to bring a motion 
to withdraw his guilty plea before filing a 
petition for habeas corpus. See Lancaster v. 
CdoJL, 763 Pid 805, 606 (Utah 1988) (per 
curiam). Thus, our review is appropriate. 
In reviewing appeals from a dismissal of a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the 
trial court's conclusions of law are re-
viewed for coiTectness. However, in re-
viewing findings of fact "we survey the 
record in the light most favorable to the 
findings and judgment; and we will not 
reverse if there is a reasonable basis there-
in to support the trial court's refusal to be 
convinced that the writ should be granted.* 
Butterfield v. Cook 817 ?26 833, 836 (Utah 
App.) (citation omitted) (quoting Medina v. 
Cook 779 P^d 658, 668 (Utah 1989)), cert 
denied, 826 PAJ 651 (Utah 1991). 
t FAILUKE TO DETERMINE PETI-
TIONER'S COMPETENCY BEFORE 
ACCEPTING GUILTY PLEA 
A. Preservation of Issue for Appeal 
CM] The Sute asserts as a threshold 
matter that the msjority of theories upon 
Dame of Dsn Kill. PrefumiMv this it s misspell* 
tog of ton Hell 
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which petitioner relies in arguing that the 
trial court should have made a finding of 
competency before accepting his change of 
plea to guilty were not presented to the 
habeas court, and thus they have not been 
preserved for appellate review. This court 
will not consider issues raised for the first 
tune on appeal absent plain error or excep-
tional circumstances. State v. Brown, 856 
T26 858, 859 (Utah App.1993); accord Stale 
v. A/die, 864 T26 890, 892-93 n. 6 (Utah 
1993). An issue is preserved for appeal 
when "a party . . . time]} bringls] the issue 
to the attention of the trial court, thus pro-
viding the court an opportunity to rule on the 
issue's merits.91 LeBarxm & Assoc, Inc. v. 
Rebel EnUr., Inc., 823 ?2d 479, 482-83 
(Utah App.1991). 
[5] We conclude the issue of whether the 
pie*-taking court should have made a compe-
tency inquiry before accepting petitioner's 
guilty plea was properly preserved for ap-
peal Although all of the legal arguments 
developed on appeal may not have been artic-
ulated below, the underlying issue was clear-
ly before the habeas court, as were the facts 
upon which petitioner now relies on appeal 
This issue was sufficiently brought to the 
habeas court's attention through petitioner's 
second amended petition and the evidence 
contained in the record. 
B. Finding of Competency 
Petitioner argues the original trial court 
erred in failing to investigate whether be wis 
competent to enter a guilty plea, He claims 
that his previous plea of not guilty, combined 
with his notice of intent to offer a defense of 
insanity and his inability to remember the 
shootings, ahould have alerted the trial court 
that there were questions regarding his com* 
petency. The State counters that petitioner 
J. Tnor to Codimz. the question of whether the 
standard for determining competency to plead 
guilty wis higher than the standard for detrrmin* 
Ins competency to stand tna] drvidtd both state 
and federal courts Compart Chavez v. United 
Stats 656 T26 512, 511-19 (9th Ctr 1911) (ap-
plying more stringent ttandard for determining 
competency to enter guilty plea than to stand 
tml) with Chchakfy v Umtad Statu, 926 T2d 
624, 633-35 (7th Cir 199J) (determining compe-
tency standard for pleading guihy fe identical to 
st no time alleged he was incompetent to 
enter a guilt}* plea. 
(6,7] Due process requires that a defen-
dant be competent to plead guilt), thope r 
Aftssouri 420 VS 162, 172, 95 S.Ct 896, 
904, 43 L.Ei2d 103 (1975), Pate v Robin-
•cm, 883 U-S. 875, 885, 86 S Ct. 836, 842,15 
LXd2d 815 (1966). "A mental)} incompe-
tent defendant can provide no defense, and 
proceedings against such a defendant do not 
comport wnh due process" State t Young 
780 ?2d 1233,1236 (Utah 1989) Additional-
ly, in order to protect a defendant's due 
process rights, s guilty plea must be volun-
tarily and knowingly made See State r. 
Gibbons, 740 ?2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987); 
State v. Stilling, 856 ?2d 666, 671 (Utah 
App.1993). 
[6] The test for competency to plead 
guilty is the same as competency to stand 
trial* "whether the defendant has 'sufficient 
present ability to consult with his [or her] 
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding9 and has 'a rational as well as 
factual understanding of the proceedings 
against him [or her].'* Godintz t Moron, 
— U.S , , 113 S Ct 2680,26S5,125 
L Edid 821 (1993) (quoting Dusky t United 
StaUt, 862 VS 402, 403, 80 SCt 788,789,4 
LXdid 824 (1960) (per curiam))1 
Courts have variously described the level 
of doubt regarding a defendant's competency 
that is required before the judge must make 
a sua sponte competency determination4 
However, courts have general!} found that 
due process requires a court to sus sponte 
determine competency before taking s guihy 
plea when there is substantial evidence of 
incompetence such that a reasonable judge 
would have a bona fide doubt as to the 
defendant's competence. See United Stain 
« Lewi* 991 F-2d 624, 527 n. 4 (9th Dr.), 
cert denied. — VS. , 114 S.CL 216,126 
competency standard for standing ttial) mid 
Shaw v Martin, 733 FJd 304, 3M (4th Ctrl 
cm dtmad 4*9 U.S 873. 105 SCt 230. 13 
LEd^d 159 (19S4) (same) 
4. Significantly, however, these terms have been 
found to describe the same conititimona! stan-
dard United Stats v Uwu, 991 F 2d 524 527 
A. 4 (9th Cir.1993), Ch**L *56 T2d si 516 a I. 
YORK v., VULSEN 
CbtttSTS TM IK) (VubApp Iff4) 
t ld id 172 (1993); United Sides v. Johns, defendant's competence.1 
S Tii 953, 956 (7th Clr.1984); Chavez v. phasis added). 
Wed State* 656 F.2d 512, 516 n. 1 (9th 
Cr.1951); People v. Thomas, 246 DLAppJd 
70S. 186 m.Dec. 505, 507, 616 NJEid 695, 
m: (1993); Berndi t\ State, 733 S.WA3 119, 
l £ (Tenn.CrinLApp.19S7). 
Utah 595 
i d at 1238 (em-
Tro Utah eases have addressed the level 
if doubt necessitating a competency determi-
aition under circumstances aomewhat similar 
io this appeal. Most recently, in State v. 
Young. 780 T2i 1233 (Utah 1989), the defen-
dant filed a notice prior to trial that he would 
Ttly en the defense of diminished capacity, 
and two alienists were appointed to examine 
kim. Id it 1235. One doctor testified that 
the defendant had a mental Alness that con-
fined of mild to moderate depression, alcohol 
abuM. mixed drug disorder, and attention 
deficit disorder. The second doctor testified 
that the defendant did not suffer from any 
stents] illness and diagnosed him as having 
cn]v an antisocial personality disorder. At 
till, the defendant testified that he had no 
recollection of the encounter with the victim. 
li 
During the fourth day of trial, defense 
counsel moved to allow the defendant to 
plead guilty and mentally ill. The defendant 
gated he wanted to "get it over with.*1 Id 
The trial judge, noting the defendant's obvi-
eu» state of emotional distress, concluded 
that the defendant's request was not made in 
a wholly deliberate and knowing manner and 
thu* refused to allow petitioner to plead 
fuflty. The defendant was subsequently 
found guilty. 
On appeal, the defendant argued that he 
should have been given a hearing on his 
competence to stand trial, claiming the judge 
rejected his plea because he was incompe-
tent Id at 1235-36. The Young court stat-
ed: "It is well established that ?ajn allega-
tion of -nervous difficulties" does not raise a 
knofide doubt at to competency.'* li at 
1237 (emphasis added) (quoting People * 
Vitok 28 IlUppid 229, 827 N£-2d 602, 
W (1975)). The court found on appeal that 
the trial Judge did not err In not holding a 
competency bearing because no objective 
fccu "raised a rtasonable doubt as to the 
Similarly, in State v. Bailey, 712 P.2d 281 
(Utah 1985), the supreme court considered a 
defendant's competence to stand trial. The 
defendant in Bailey had been in the prison 
hospital, and the prison psychiatrist found 
him not competent to stand trial; however, 
two other doctors later determined he was 
competent to stand trial. Id at 282. The 
trial court did not hold a bearing on bis 
competency to stand trial, nor did defense 
counsel petition for such a bearing. Id The 
Bailey court held that the defendant was not 
entitled to a competency bearing when his 
most recent psychiatric evaluations indicated 
be was competent and be filed no petition. 
li at 265. 
(9] In determining whether a trial court 
should have had doubts as to competency, an 
appellate court may consider only those facts 
that were before the court when the plea was 
entered. See Levis, 991 F2d at S27; 
Williams v. Bordenkircker, 696 F-2d 464,467 
(6th Or.), cert denied 461 U-S. 916, 103 
S.CL 1898, 77 L.Ed2d 287 (1983); Berndt 
733 S.WJM at 122. Thus, we must determine 
whether the information known to the trial 
court at the time of petitioner's plea hearing 
should have raised a bona fide doubt regard-
ing bis competency. 
[10] At the plea hearing, the court had an 
extended dialogue with defendant, which in-
cluded: 
MR. DIUMENTI [defense counsel]: . . . 
Mr. York desires to enter a plea of guilty. 
Do you have any questions, Don, about 
what your prerogatives ait and what your 
rights are? 
MR. YORK: No. The only thing I ask, 
Your Honor, is that since I have no memo-
ry of it, I ask that before you sentence me, 
that you send me down for evaluation. 
THE COURT: Tfcat will go a Httlejkttr, 
let me first aak you, Mr. McGuire Jtfounsel 
for the Bute] . . . . 
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THE COURT: Now, are you under the 
influence of any drugs or alcohol at this 
time? 
MR. YORK: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Are you being treated for 
any mental illness? 
MR. YORK: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You are receiving no medi-
cations in that regard? 
MR, YORK: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Are you satisfied with the 
counsel that you have received from Mr. 
Diumenti in this matter? 
MR. YORK: Very much so, yes. 
THE COURT: You have gone over it 
thoroughly with him? 
MR. YORK: Yes, Your Honor, I have. 
THE COURT: Now, are you willing to 
plead guilt}* because you are in fact guilt}*? 
MR. DIUMENTI: Your Honor, if I might, 
AS far as Count II is concerned, I believe 
that's a fair statement and I believe Mr. 
York wQl answer in the affirmative. 
As far AS Count I is concerned, Your 
Honor has seen both the psychiatric and 
the psychological . . . unfortunately the 
blackout periods thai they have talked 
about deaJ with Mr. Longhurst Don has, 
number one, reviewed all of the evidence 
and the testimony And I, the only reason I 
interject At this point in time is I know he's 
going to tell the Court that . . . that's the 
way it looked but objectively he can't aay 
yea. 
I told him also, however, and advised 
him, that it is valid for A person not recall-
ing, [fior Any of several reasons, the exact 
UeU of an event to enter a plea of guilty 
Attendant a negotiated settlement so they 
do not unnecessarily, and in Addition I 
believe unwisely subjects themselves to the 
potential of being convicted of a more seri-
ous crime. 
And to it I might, Don, do you under-
stand what the Judge w d as far as Count 
II? 
MR. YORK: Yea, air. 
MR. DIUMENTI: Are you entering a plea 
of fuQty on your belief that you in fact 
engaged in conduct that is described jn 
that act? 
MR. YORK: Yes. 
MR. DIUMENTI: As far as Count L 
THE COURT: Well, let the Court ask you 
then, Mr. York, as far as Count I. That 
requires that you be proved beyond a m-
aonable doubt to have intentionally or 
knowingly caused the .death of Jeff LOB-
ghurst And are you willing to enter s 
plea of guilt>' to that charge? 
MR. YORK: To get this over with, I inD 
do that, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You rtAliae that by so do> 
ing, AS far as this Court is concerned, you 
have Admitted that particular charge? 
MR. YORK: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And that you have waived 
all those rights which I have explained to 
you previously in connection with that par-
ticular charge? 
MR. YORK: I'm fully aware. 
The transcript of this hearing lacks any 
statement or occurrence indicating that peti-
tioner was acting other than in an entirely 
rational manner. Petitioner answered all 
questions directed to him without any appar-
ent hesitation or lack of comprehension. 
Furthermore, the evaluations of Drs. Ghi* 
eadus and Kimball, which were available to 
the court, do not raise a reasonable doubt u 
to petitioner's competency. Both examiners 
diagnosed him as suffering from borderline 
personality disorder, but neither evaluation 
indicated that he was not competent to plead 
guilty. In fact, both examinations shoved 
petitioner to be without psychoses or serious 
mental problems. In his psychiatric evalua-
tion, Dr. Kimball stated that petitioner 
"shows no signs of Any psychoses, illogical 
thinking, delusions or hallucinations. Hi* 
train of thought appears to be normal" 
Similarly, Dr. Ghicadus summarised: 
TUxt is ftirther nE evidence of a psyehosfe 
or other mental problem that would mske 
him so seriously unstable as to not be Able 
to make a decision about his behavior. It 
is therefore, my conclusion thai tht ff*m 
if menially competent io undentand trid 
<i> 
froetedings and would be able to assist in 
kis defense. (Emphasis added). 
ft>us. there was pre-plea evidence of compe-
tency. See Johnson v. United States 633 
Aid 828, 832 (D.C.1993) (holding in context 
of motion to withdraw guilty plea, competen-
cy hearing "not required if there is a pre-plea 
determination of competence baaed on a psy-
chiatric evaluation"). 
[11] The evidence petitioner contends 
shows his entitlement to a competency hear-
iif it the time he pled guilty is his previous 
aotice of intent to raise the defense of insani-
ty and his communicated lack of memory of 
the shootings. However, the mere filing of 
notice to rely on the defense of insanity is not 
sufficient to require a competency hearing 
before accepting a guilty plea. See In re 
Hanson 623 K2& 466 (VU993) (finding prior 
successful insanity plea did not require court 
to inquire into defendant's competency). -
(12,13) Furthermore, a defendant with 
amnesia is not per ae incompetent to plead 
guilty. State v. Owens, 248 Kan. 273, 807 
Pid 101,106-07 (1991); accord Thomas, 616 
KXid at 698. A defendant may plead 
guilty although he or ahe has no recollection 
of the incident for which he or ahe is 
charged. Commonwealth v. Hubbard* 871 
Mass. 160, 355 KXid 469, 475 (1976); State 
'. m*r. 292 Minn. 453,193 N.Wid 819,820 
il9?2) (per curiam); People v. Francaband-
fw. 33 N.Yid 429, 354 N.Y.S.2d 609,614-15, 
330 X.Eid 292, 296 (1974). Whether amne-
sia renders a defendant incompetent is evalu-
ated on a case-by-case basis. Owens, 807 
T26 at 106. In taking a guilty plea under 
such circumstances, courts look to the fair-
Bess of the proceeding as affected by the 
defendant's amnesia. A defendant cannot 
ptead guilty if the fairness of the proceeding 
fc compromised. Id; People ft Douglas, 189 
*&2d 241,52? X.Y£2d 151,153 QJ.YJBap. 
1988) (finding trial court could accept defen-
d s guilty plea as voluntary and intelli-
frat, despite genuine lack of recall due to 
ttumatic amnesia). 
3- The Tenth Circuit stated: ICJompetency Is a 
fcctual issue subject to the presumption « cor-
*nness." Laffeny v. Cook, 949 T2d at 1549. 
Hovrver, the presumption of wrtctotu It not 
YORK v. 8HULSEN 
i»S7S T2d SSO (UuhApp. tH4) 
Utah 597 
Based on the facts of this ease, we cannot 
My the trial court erred in concluding defen-
dant was able to enter a knowing guilty plea, 
despite his alleged inability to remember the 
ahootings. In sum, the information known to 
the trial court at the time of the plea hearing 
does not indicate that it ahould have had a 
bona fide reasonable doubt with respect to 
petitioner's competency to plead guilty. 
n . HABEAS COURTS FINDING 
OF COMPETENCY 
Petitioner next contends that the habeas 
court erred by finding be was competent at 
the time be entered his guilty plea. The 
State responds that petitioner has failed to 
meet his burden to marshal the evidence and 
additionally that even if he is able to over-
come the marshaling requirement, the habe-
as court properly determined he was compe-
tent to plead guilty. 
{14,15} Competency is a factual issue, re-
viewed under Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Stale v. Drobel 815 P.2d 
724, 734 (Utah App.), cert denied 836 P-2d 
1883 (Utah 1991); ocecmf Lafferiy v. Cook 
949 F^d 1546, 1549 (10th Cir.1991), cert 
denied, — US. , 112 S.CL 1942, 118 
L.Ed2d 548 (1992); * Stale u Lafferiy, 749 
?2A 1239,1243-44 (Utah 1988). Rule 52(a) 
provides: "Findings of fact, whether based 
on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be 
aet aside unless clearly erroneous, and due 
regard shall be given to the opportunity of 
the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses." Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). "A finding 
attacked as lacking adequate evidentiary sup-
port is deemed 'dearly erroneous1 only if we 
conclude that the finding is against the clear 
weight of the evidence.91 Reid t?. Mutual qf 
Omaha Ins. Co, 776 P.2d 896,899-900 (Utah 
1989). We review the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the trial court's findings 
and affirm if there is a reasonable basis for 
doing ao. Gillmor * Gillmor, 745 P.2d 461, 
462 (Utah App.1987), cert denied, 765 T2d 
1278 (Utah 1988). It is petitioner's burden 
to show the judgment was clearly erroneous. 
irrebuttable; ttjhe threshold question Is wheth-
er the competency determination is fairly sup-
ported by the record." Id at a. 1. 
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Stewart v. StaU, 830 P^d 806, 808 (Utah 
App.1992). 
[16] As a prerequisite to in attack on 
findings of fact, the petitioner must marshal 
all evidence in support of the findings and 
demonstrate "that the evidence, including all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is 
insufficient to support the findings.9* Gray-
ton Roper Lid v. Firdinton, 782 ?2A 467, 
470 (Utah 1989); eet West Valley City v. 
Majestic Inv. Co, 618 F2& 1811,1815 (Utah 
App.1991) (discussing in detail what "oner-
ous* marshaling burden entails for appel-
lants). This marshaling requirement pro-
Tides the appellate court the basis from 
which to conduct a meaningful and expedient 
review of facts challenged on appeal. See 
Wright v. Wttteide Nurtery. 787 ?2A 608, 
612 n. 2 (Utah App.1990). 
[17] In the present ease, petitioner does 
not meet his marshaling burden; rather, he 
merely reargues the evidence most favorable 
to him, leaving it to this court to sort out 
what evidence actually supports the habeas 
court's competency determination. Because 
he has failed to meet this burden, we decline 
to consider the merits of his argument on 
appeal Crookston v. Fin Iru ExcK 817 
P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991).* 
CONCLUSION 
The information known to the trial court at 
the time of the plea hearing does not indicate 
that the trial judge should have had a bona 
fide doubt with respect to petitioner's compe-
tency to plead guilty. Furthermore, we re-
fuse to consider petitioner9* elaim that the 
trial court erred in finding him competent at 
the time he entered his guilty plea because 
S. However, our review of the record tugf est* the 
likelihood that tufficient evidence tupports the 
habeas court'• finding that peuooner wis compe-
tent at the tune he entered his guilty plea. Dr. 
Carlisle teftified that although petitioner proba-
bly suffered from MPD at the time of the shoot* 
fngs he was nevertheless competent to have pled 
ffuihy. He further testified that petitioner would 
have been able to think rationally, form a mental 
itate of intent to kili, understand the nature of 
the proceedings and the nature of the crime, 
comprehend the reasons for punishment, and 
assist his attorney. Dr. Carlisle explained that 
petitioner "would have the rational thought of 
determining whether or not [pleading guilty] was 
be has failed to meet his burden to marshal 
the evidence. Nevertheless, there is an a6V 
quate evidentiary foundation for the habeas 
court's determination that petitioner t*s 
competent at the time he entered his guih} 
pleas. Accordingly, we affirm the trial 
court's denial of petitioner's habeas corpus 
petition. 
DAVIS, J- and ORME, Associate PJ„ 
concur. 
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Divorce action was brought. The fturd 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Ttoothj R. 
Hanson, J., entered a final decree of divorce 
Husband appealed. The Court of Appeals. 
Davis, J„ held that (1) trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in awarding wife $800 
per month alimony; (2) finding that husband 
spent loan, a marital debt, to maintain and 
improve business building was not dearly 
the choice he wanted to make at the erne " Df 
Carbsie also testified that if the host personal* 
had real}y beec unaware of what the alternate 
personality had done, he would have expected 
more confusion and inability to remember m 
petitioner's statements at the police station, and 
that It wis possible petitioner was blockmf n» 
memory. Furthermore, the trial court's nndaf* 
and conclusions dear!) indicate the court ap-
pbed the appropriate leg*J standard in findfflf 
petitioner competent to plead fuih>. as required 
by Dusky v Vnuti SIOJCS, H2 t).S 403,10 $ & 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DONALD WILLIAM YORK, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEAS 
Case No. 841704638 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
The above-captioned matter came before the Court on August 13,1997 for 
an evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Defendant was 
present and was represented by Jerold McPhee. Plaintiff was represented by Angela F. 
Micklos Assistant Attorney General. After hearing testimony and oral argument, the Court 
now enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1 . On June 17,1984, defendant purchased with cash an airline ticket to 
fly from California to Salt Lake City under the name Dan Hill. Defendant brought with him 
$6,000 in traveler's checks, and an undetermined amount of cash. After his arrival in Salt 
Lake City later that day, defendant rented a car using the name Donald York. Thereafter, 
defendant drove to the home of his ex-wife, Patricia York. Defendant, armed with a loaded 
gun, entered his ex-wife's home. Defendant went to Ms. York's bedroom and fired twelve 
to fourteen shots, seriously wounding Ms. York and killing her boyfriend, Jeff Longhurst. 
2. Moments after the shootings, defendant surrendered himself to the 
Bountiful police. Defendant told officers that there had been a fight at Ms. York's residence 
and asked whether Ms. York and Mr. Longhurst were alive. Defendant also told police 
where to find the gun and shells, and that for what he had done he was going to hell and 
could no longer be a member of his church. 
3. In June 1984, defendant was charged in the Second Judicial District 
Court, Davis County, with first degree murder, a capital offense, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-202 (1984); attempted second degree murder, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-203 (1979), 76-4-102 (1983) and aggravated burglary, 
a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (1973). 
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4. Pursuant to a plea agreement, an amended information was filed in 
October 1984 charging defendant with the reduced offenses of second degree murder, a 
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1979) and attempted 
manslaughter, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1975). 
Additionally, the State agreed not to seek a firearm enhancement and also agreed to 
recommend that defendant be sentenced to concurrent terms. 
5. On December 6, 1984, the trial court sentenced defendant to serve 
five years to life in the Utah State Prison for the second degree murder, to run 
consecutively with a term of zero to five years for attempted manslaughter. The trial court 
further ordered defendant to pay a $3,600 victim restitution fee. 
6. The evidence against defendant was overwhelming. Defendant's 
daughter, Anita, told police and would have testified that she saw defendant walk past her 
bedroom holding a gun; that she heard several shots; and that she overheard Longhurst 
state an epithet that defendant had shot him. At the hospital, defendant's ex-wife, Patricia, 
identified defendant as the shooter and identified defendant's gun as the murder weapon. 
7. It is uncontroverted that on June 17,1984, prior to flying to Salt Lake 
City, defendant called Patricia York and told her that if he found Mr. Longhurst within 50 
feet of her, that defendant was going to come up and kill Longhurst. Defendant made 
some reference to shooting Longhurst "like a dog." 
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8. When defendant arrived at police dispatch in Bountiful, the dispatcher 
was on the 911 call with Anita York, who was giving the dispatcher information about the 
shooting. While the dispatcher was still on the phone with Anita, defendant told the 
dispatcher, Tm the man who did the shooting. I'm the man you are looking for." 
9. Subsequently, at the hospital, defendant asked several hospital 
personnel if the victim was dead and stated that he (defendant) would no longer be a 
member of the church and that he would go to hell. 
10. If defendant had elected to go to trial, his incriminating statements to 
police and others, as well as several inconsistent statements, would have been admitted 
into evidence. 
11. Defendant originally filed a notice of defense claiming that he was not 
guilty by reason of insanity or that he had diminished mental capacity at the time the 
offenses occurred. Accordingly, the trial court ordered that defendant be examined as to 
his "mental condition" and appointed Doctors Chris Ghicadus and Heber C. Kimball of the 
Davis County Health Department, to conduct the examination. Both doctors concluded 
that defendant was not mentally ill. 
12. During the criminal proceedings, defendant was represented by 
George Diumenti. By 1984 when he represented defendant, Mr. Diumenti was a seasoned 
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defense attorney who had previously represented a client in a capital jury trial which 
resulted in a non-death verdict. 
13. Prior to accepting defendant's case, Mr. Diumenti contacted the police 
and the county attorney to determine the evidence supporting the charges. Mr. Diumenti 
then discussed the case with his partner, Bill Lindsley. Mr. Diumentfs practice was to 
double-team capital cases. 
14. Mr. Diumenti charges a flat rate in criminal cases. He discussed with 
defendant a $15,000 fee for representing defendant in this case. Approximately one month 
prior to the preliminary hearing, defendant paid Mr. Diumenti a $6,000 retainer from the 
traveler's checks that he brought with him from California. Mr. Diumenti did not get 
involved in debt collection issues, and throughout the remainder of his representation of 
defendant, Mr. Diumenti was unaware whether defendant had an outstanding balance. 
15. Mr. Diumenti met with defendant several times and discussed all the 
evidence and possible trial strategies. Mr. Diumenti regularly contacted defendant and 
kept him informed of new factual or legal developments. 
16. At the evidentiary hearing, defendant recalled having seen many of 
the police reports prior to trial. 
17. As a matter of general practice, Mr. Diumenti did not ask his clients 
whether they committed the crime because then he would be unable to call his clients to 
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testify on their own behalf, if necessary. Mr. Diumenti's practice was to review defense 
scenarios with his clients to see if any were plausible. 
18. Mr. Diumenti discussed possible defenses with defendant and 
researched the current law to determine a defense theory. Mr. Diumenti's primary concern 
was to avoid the death penalty. Therefore, he did not want to pursue an implausible 
defense that would undermine his credibility in front of a jury. 
19. Initially, Mr. Diumenti was planning to pursue a "heat of passion" type 
defense based upon defendant's rage after learning that Jeff Longhurst was at Patricia 
York's house. However, defendant's claim of amnesia defeated this defense. Mr. 
Diumenti did not believe that defendant lacked memory of the crime because there was" 
no independent evidence supporting it, and defendant claimed to remember some details 
of the crime (e.g. a struggle with Jeff Longhurst), but not the actual shooting. 
20. In addition to the claim of amnesia, defendant informed Mr. Diumenti 
of the following possible defenses: (a) that an unknown third person was the shooter; (b) 
that Anita was the shooter; and (c) the Patricia York set up defendant for her own personal 
gain. In light of the overwhelming evidence against defendant, Mr. Diumenti declined to 
pursue defendant's suggested defenses. Mr. Diumenti felt that in order to maintain 
credibility in front of a jury, he must believe in the defense theory. Defendant's alternative 
theories were simply implausible. 
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21. Defendant claims that he had no memory of the shooting when he pled 
guilty. This claim of amnesia is not credible given: (a) the details he offered to the police 
and other personnel; (b) his conversations with Mr. Diumenti, and (c) defendant's testimony 
at the evidentiary hearing regarding whether he had ever seen specific pages of numerous 
police reports thirteen years ago. If defendant had presented an amnesia defense at trial, 
a jury would almost certainly have drawn a conclusion of convenient amnesia which would 
have devastated any kind of insanity defense, in addition to Mr. Diumenti's credibility with 
the jury. 
22. After reading the reports of Dr. Ghicadusand Dr. Kimball, Mr. Diumenti 
saw no basis for an insanity or diminished capacity defense. After full consideration of the 
evidence, Mr. Diumenti made the strategic decision to forego further psychiatric testing of 
defendant. Defendant acquiesced in the withdrawal of the insanity or diminished capacity 
defense after Mr. Diumenti presented alternative theories and explained the ramifications 
of withdrawing the defense. 
23. Defendant claims that Mr. Diumenti was deficient for failing to 
investigate. The only additional evidence offered was the fact that Mr. Diumenti did not 
conduct a comparison of the serial numbers on defendant's gun and the gun used in the 
shooting. Mr. Diumenti's failure to research the serial numbers was not deficient, given the 
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eyewitness to the shooting, defendant's confession, and Patricia York's identification of 
petitioner's gun as the murder weapon. 
24. In Mr. Diumenti's opinion, the prosecutor's plea offer was very 
reasonable. Mr. Diumenti fully explained to defendant the benefits and consequences of 
pleading guilty. Mr. Diumenti discussed with defendant the elements of the offenses 
charged in the amended information, and reviewed with defendant the statutory elements 
and the evidence supporting them. 
25. Mr. Diumenti did not tell defendant to go along with the system in an 
effort to induce defendant to plead guilty. If Mr. Diumenti used the phrase "go along with 
the system" it was in reference to following institutional rules once in prison. 
26. Mr. Diumenti did not tell defendant that he (defendant) would go to the 
state hospital if he pled guilty. 
27. Defendant made the ultimate decision whether to accept the plea offer, 
and did not insist on going to trial. 
28. Mr. Diumenti informed defendant that Susan Wilson, prosecutor Mel 
Wilson's1 wife, was the AP&P agent who would prepare defendant's presentence 
investigation report. Mr. Diumenti made the strategic decision to have Ms. Wilson prepare 
1Although Mel Wilson had some involvement with the crime scene, he did not 
handle the plea negotiations on behalf of the State. Bill McGuire was the prosecutor in 
this matter. 
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the report. Mr. Diumenti had known Ms. Wilson since 1970 and knew her to be open-
minded, accurate, and compassionate. In Mr. Diumenti's opinion, it was in defendant's 
best interest to have Ms. Wilson conduct the presentence investigation. Defendant had 
no objection to Ms. Wilson. 
29. Ms. Wilson included several mitigating statements in the presentence 
report, and defendant has failed to identify any errors in the report. 
30. There is no evidence to support defendant's claim of a conflict of 
interest based upon Mr. Diumenti allegedly turning over $14,000 in defense funds to an 
undisclosed third person. 
31. The Court does not find the testimony of Mildreth Gilgen credible or 
relevant. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant's challenges to his competency to stand trial and to the trial 
court's failure to hold a formal competency hearing have been previously litigated in York 
v. Shulsen. 875 P.2d 590, 592 (Utah App. 1994). Accordingly, the Court declines to revisit 
these issues here. 
2. In order to prevail on his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that specific acts or omissions 
fall outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance, and that counsel's 
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deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of the proceeding. In order to demonstrate 
prejudice in the context of a guilty plea, defendant must prove that absent counsel's errors, 
defendant would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. 
3. Mr. Diumenti reasonably concluded that the plea offer was in 
defendant's best interest, and did not coerce defendant to plead guilty. Defendant faced 
a capital homicide conviction which was supported by the evidence. A jury could very well 
have imposed the death penalty if the matter had gone to trial. 
4. Defendant has failed to prove any specific acts or omissions of Mr. 
Diumenti which constitute deficient performance. Accordingly, there is no need to examine 
the issue of prejudice. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Based on the foregoing, the Court denies defendant's motion to withdraw his 
guilty pleas. 
DATED this *(£* day of Acnrw-k* 1937. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABUE RODNEY S. PAGE 
Second District Court 
10 
Approved as to form: 
jierold D. M c P h e e $ r ~Zc\r\y r n c^^oio 
Attorney for defendant u>o c a t O^-^VJ- C C V ^ ^ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF 
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW & ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEAS was mailed, postage prepaid, this 7^\ day of October, 
1997 to: 
Jerold D. McPhee 
Attorney for Defendant 
336 S. 300 E., Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2505 
(gUjJL/^. vUici^to 
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SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTS-
STATE OF UTAH 
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH , 
Plaintiff(s), 
vs. 
DONALD WILLIAM YORK, 
Defendant(s). 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
GUILTY PLEA 
Case No. 841704638 
Rodney S. Page, Judge 
Comes now the Court and having review Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea 
and the Memorandum submitted in support thereof and the State's Memorandum and Exhibits 
submitted in opposition thereto, and being fully advised in the premises, the Court hereby 
rules as follows: 
The defendant has previously filed numerous petitions for Habeas Corpus dating back 
to April of 1985. The issues raised herein have all been raised in one form or another in 
these prior petitions. 
Although the matter here under consideration is a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, it 
is considered as a post-judgment writ; and therefore, the law generally applicable to post-
judgment writs is applicable to the matter here before the Court. In that regard, the law 
generally bars issues which have been previously adjudicated or which could have been 
adjudicated in a prior proceeding. An exception is made as to those issues where the 
petitioner can show unusual circumstances or good cause. 
A showing of good cause may be established by showing, among other things, the 
existence of fundamental unfairness in a conviction. 
In the matter here before the Court, the Court concludes that the issue of the failure to 
conduct a competency hearing prior to plea and the issue of Defendant's competency at the 
time his plea was entered have been previously adjudicated before the Third District Court 
and the Court of Appeals, and there is no good cause or unusual circumstances which would 
justify the Court in again looking at those issues. Therefore, the Court hereby denies those 
basis for any motion to set aside a plea of guilty in this matter. 
The Court concludes that the issues of ineffective assistance of counsel, counsel's 
conflict of interest and the question of whether Defendant's plea was made knowingly and 
voluntarily, if as alleged by the defendant do manifest a fundamental unfairness in the 
conviction; and therefore constitute good cause to allow this Court to adjudicate those issues. 
As to whether Defendant's plea was taken in accordance with State Statute and Case 
Law in effect at the time, the Court has reviewed the transcript of Defendant's plea taken on 
October 29, 1994. In reviewing the transcript as a whole, the Court concludes that the taking 
of Defendant's plea substantially complied with the Statute and Case Law then in effect; and 
therefore denies Defendant's Motion based on that argument. 
As to the other issues bearing on the voluntariness of Defendant's plea, the claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel and counsel's conflict of interest, these matters will be set for 
evidentiary hearing. 
The Court will immediately set the matter on for pre-trial and notify counsel of the 
date. 
Defendant's counsel will prepare Findings and Judgment in accordance with the 
Court's Ruling and submit the same to Plaintiffs counsel at least five days prior to the time it 
is submitted to the Court for signature. 
Dated this ^M^day of January, 1997. 
By the Court: 
District Courpuudge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I , the undersigned, do hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing, Ruling, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Ms. Angela F. Micklos Mr. Jerold D. McPhee 
Assistant Attorney General 336 South 300 East Suite 200 
P.O. Box 140854 Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2505 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-1854 
Mr. Carvel R. Harward 
Deputy Davis County Attorney 
800 West State Street 
Farmington, Ut 84025 
Dated this ^ 1 day of January, 1997. 
&ut^<-<> ^JTC/'-^^ 
Clerk/ Deputy Clerk 
A D D E N D U M D 
Jerold D. McPhee (3662) A . 
Attorney for Uie Plaintiff * t$ . 
336 South 300 East, Suite 200 c/^ ^ 3c 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2504 - cv..
 r
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Telephone: (801) 322-1616 s; t^^  
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY* 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DONALD WILLIAM YORK, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 841704638 FS 
Judge: Rodney S. Page 
S T I P U L A T I O N 
COMES NOW the parties in the above-entitled action, the State of Utah and the Defendant, [W i ^ 
Donald William York, by and through their respective counsel, Ms. Angela F. Micklos, Assistant J 
Attorney General, and Jerold D. McPhee, herewith stipulate and agree as follo\*£: o^A fOs • vohn UCL , 
1. That Ms. Mary Minick (Peterson) gave Mr. Diumenti a check for $14,000.00 dollars ^ . ^ Ji 
for the Defendant's bail or defense. 
2. That the $14,000.00 dollar check was made payable to Ms. Mary Minick (Peterson). 
3. That Ms. Mary Minick (Peterson) told Mr. Diumenti that she would endorse the check 
over to a bail bondsman as soon as she was informed of who the bail bondsman was to be? 
4. That Ms. Mary Minick (Peterson) was not called or consulted about releasing the 
1-
Check to Mr. Dave Randall. 
5. That Ms. Mary Minick (Peterson) did not endorse the check over to anyone. 
6. It was Ms. Mary Minick's understanding that Mr. Diumenti would keep the check until 
he found a bail bondsman. 
7. The Court can take judicial notice that when bail would have been available to the 
Defendant, on or about June 24, 1984, or thereafter, a bail bondsman's fee was 10% of bail .
 A u ;>v* 
^^c* * * * * * * * * 
- / u i y 8. The parties further stipulate and agree that Patricia Minick- YorkVas present when> offu^<X^\ 
^C Mr. Diumenti directed Chris York and Dave Randll to go to the crime scene and remove all 
"evidence" possible and bring it back to Diumenti 
DATED this >'" day of August, 1997. 
Jrfold D. McPhee 
ttorney for Defendant 
O^yL % vKKcfafo^ 
Angela F. Micklos 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for the Plaintiff 
O 
